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BEYOND THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS:
EXPANDING THE ROLE OF
SERVICEWOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES MILITARY
JAMES D. MILKO
"I swore the same oath that everybody else who is in the military
did. It is not by exception, it is not by exclusion. I swore to de-
fend the country, my country and my Constitution. So that is my
opinion."
-Major Barbara Kucharczyk l
INTRODUCTION
The role of the combat soldier in the United States military is a
position that traditionally has been denied to women in American
society. While women have played a vital part in the functioning of
the armed forces, at no time in our past has there ever been substan-
tial participation of women in combat.2 In 1948, the United States
Congress passed statutory restrictions prohibiting women from
I. Women in the Military: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1990) [hereinafter Military Personnel
Hearings] (statement of Major Barbara A. Kucharczyk, USAF, Commander, Equipment Main-
tenance Squadron, 363rd Tactical Fighter Wing).
2. See George H. Quester, The Problem, in FEMALE SOLDIERS---COMBATANTS OR NONCOM-
BATANTS? HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 217, 218 (Nancy L. Goldman ed.,
1982) (reviewing history of female participation in American armed forces and concluding it
has not been substantial); see also S. REP. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2612, 2647 (remarking that while women have at times been inadvertently
drawn into combat, throughout history they have not regularly participated in battle). For
examples of isolated incidents of American women engaging in combat, see infra note 8 and
accompanying text.
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serving in combat positions in the Navy3 and the Air Force.4 This
congressional action reflected a general widespread perception of
the era regarding the proper role of women in society.5 Since that
time, the Army, reading the Navy and Air Force statutes as signify-
ing a congressional intent to bar women from all combat, promul-
gated internal regulations prohibiting women from combat
assignment.6
Recent events in the Persian Gulf have presented an opportunity
for reexamination of the wisdom of these exclusions. This Comment
seeks to reassess the traditional arguments for and against prohibit-
ing women from combat in the context of the Persian Gulf War ex-
perience. The Comment further examines changes to the statutory
restrictions promulgated by Congress as a direct result of the war.
While recent action by Congress is a very positive step in opening
military positions to qualified women, this Comment asserts that
further action is required. In particular, the Comment contends
that combat positions should be opened to qualified women on a
volunteer basis. Finally, the Comment suggests that opening com-
3. 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1988), as amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-90, § 531(a), 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991). Section
6015 states:
The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe the manner in which women . . . of the
Regular Navy and the Regular Marine Corps shall be trained and qualified for mili-
tary duty. The Secretary may prescribe the kind of duty to which such women mem-
bers may be assigned and the military authority which they may exercise. However,
women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in
combat missions nor may they be assigned to other than temporary duty on vessels
of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels of a similar classification
not expected to be assigned combat missions.
Id. For a discussion of recent changes in this statute, see infra note 149 and accompanying
text.
4. 10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1988), repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-90, § 531(a), 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991). Section
8549 stated in relevant part: "Female members of the Air Force... may not be assigned to
duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions." For a discussion of the forces behind the repeal
of this statute, see infra note 149 and accompanying text.
5. See Women in the Military: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on ArmedServices, 100th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 75 (1987 and 1988) (herein-
after Women in the Military Hearings] (statement of Martin Ferber, Senior Associate Director,
National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office) (stating that
women's role in society in 1948 made assignment to combat unthinkable).
6. The Secretary of the Army is given statutory discretion to promulgate such regula-
tions under 10 U.S.C. § 3013(g) (1988), which states in relevant part: "The Secretary of the
Army may-(1) assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of members of the Army ... and (3)
prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title." The
Army asserts that its exclusion of women from combat positions is based on congressional
intent, as demonstrated by congressional enactment of the statutory restrictions. See Military
Personnel Hearings, supra note 1, at 24 (statement of Lieutenant General A.K. Ono, Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army) (stating that Army's rules prohibiting women from
combat are in compliance with intent of Congress, interpreted in light of exclusions that apply
to Navy and Air Force).
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bat positions to women on a volunteer basis would not result in the
overturning of the male-only draft registration law.
Part I briefly summarizes the historical role of women in the
armed forces and details the birth and evolution of the prohibitions
of women in combat. Part II analyzes the major arguments sur-
rounding combat exclusions in light of the lessons learned from the
Persian Gulf War.7 Part III examines recent changes in the restric-
tions and identifies a concern regarding the opening of combat posi-
tions to women: whether elimination of combat prohibitions would
mandate the conscription of women in any future draft. Part IV dis-
cusses the likely status of the current draft registration law if all
combat restrictions are ultimately lifted. Part V concludes by rec-
ommending a future course of action for further opening of the mil-
itary to women.
I. WOMEN IN THE MILITARY AND THE PROHIBITION FROM COMBAT
A. Women in Wartime
Throughout the military history of the United States, women have
served the nation's armed forces with bravery and valor. In the War
of American Independence, women aided the revolutionary effort
by diligently performing nursing and supporting roles, and on occa-
sion, by engaging in combat alongside male soldiers of the Conti-
nental Army.8 Later in the American Civil War, women again
functioned in traditional roles of support.9
As the United States became involved in the First and Second
7. In this Comment, all laws and policies prohibiting women from combat will hereinaf-
ter be referred to as the "combat exclusions."
8. See HELEN ROGAN, MIXED COMPANY 120-23 (1981) (detailing exploits of several fe-
male revolutionary war heroes). The most famous female participant of the Revolutionary
War, Deborah Sampson Gannett, disguised herself as a man in order to enlist in the 4th
Massachusetts Regiment. Id. at 121. Weakened by wounds suffered in battle, Gannett suc-
cumbed to a severe fever and was hospitalized, where her attending physician discovered her
sex. Id. at 122. The doctor agreed to keep Gannett's gender a secret, and on recovery she
joined the 11th Massachusetts Regiment. I Following the war, Gannett revealed her true
identity to the public and received an honorable discharge. Id. Other women similarly distin-
guished themselves in the heat of battle during the war. Id. at 120-23. Margaret Corbin, who
assumed her husband's position at the cannon after he was killed in combat, was wounded
and suffered permanent injuries. Id. at 121. Likewise, Mary Hays suffered battle wounds
when she took over her felled husband's position at the cannon. Id. Both women received
government pensions after the war, and Corbin is buried in the West Point Cemetery. Id
9. See id. at 123 (stating that majority of women who participated in Civil War per-
formed traditional supportive chores as nurses and laundresses rather than engaging in direct
combat). See generally MATr E E. TREADWELL, THE WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS 6 (1954) (describing
role of women in U.S. Army from 1776 through World War II). The Civil War experience
demonstrated a greater need for organization in these crucial support services, as highlighted
by the fact that problems with medical care during the conflict resulted partially from the
absence of an official, integrated nurse corps. Id. at 50.
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World Wars, participation of women in the U.S. military gradually
increased. During World War I, a modest number of American wo-
men served as nurses at hospital units in France.' 0 Furthermore, in
response to a request by General George Pershing, American civil-
ian women were employed under contract as auxiliaries near the
front lines of battle." These groups of women were referred to as
auxiliaries because, although uniformed, they had no actual military
status. 12
With the onset of World War II, the use of women's auxiliaries
became widespread. Nazi Germany's rapid blitzkrieg through Eu-
rope in 1940 quickly prompted the creation of a women's auxiliary
service for each branch of the U.S. military.' 3 Although the auxil-
iary corps experienced early difficulties involving supply shortages
and logistical problems, the demand for their services quickly esca-
lated. 14 In the summer of 1943, the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps
(WAAC) was transformed by law into the Women's Army Corps
10. See ROGAN, supra note 8, at 124 (noting that Army and Navy retained services of over
23,000 women nurses during World War I, many of whom served under hazardous condi-
tions). Congress established the Army Nurse Corps in 1901. TREADWELL, supra note 9, at 6.
The Army Nurse Corps functioned as a military organization yet operated without the benefits
of Army rank, officer status, or equal pay. Id. The fact that female nurses served in a uni-
formed military corps, however, represented a significant early step toward the full integra-
tion of women in the armed forces. Id.; see infra note 11 (explaining differences in military
status between nurses employed by Army and those employed by Navy and Marine Corps).
11. ROGAN, supra note 8, at 124. One hundred and thirty French-speaking American
women served as telephone operators under hazardous conditions at the front lines in re-
sponse to General Pershing's request. Id. These women, prohibited by law from enlistment,
served under contract to the U.S. Army and received none of the medical, housing, and other
benefits afforded to servicemen. Id. Unlike the Army, however, the Navy actually enlisted a
small number of women in the Navy and Marine Corps as nurses during the war. See QPester,
supra note 2, at 218 (noting that similar move to enlist women in Army met with congressional
opposition despite support of General Pershing). At the war's end, demobilization involved
the discharge of women, and thereby returned the military to its all-male status. Id. at 219.
12. See TREADWELL, supra note 9, at 6 (analogizing status of Army Nurse Corps to Wo-
men's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC)-a "military organization, but without Army rank, of-
ficer status, equal pay, or Army benefits such as retirement and veteran's rights").
13. See TREADWELL, supra note 9, at 6 (describing formation of women's auxiliary serv-
ices). During the period between the First and Second World Wars, various proposals were
formulated involving the future mobilization of women in wartime. Id. These proposals were
never fully developed, however, because the peacetime environment lacked the general ur-
gency needed to illustrate the necessity for such a plan. Id. This sense of security was shat-
tered by Hitler's early victories in Europe, which subsequently provided impetus for the
establishment of women's auxiliary services. Id. Thus, the WAAC (Women's Auxiliary Army
Corps) and the WAVES (Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service) were created for
the Army and Navy, respectively. Id. The Marine Corps and Coast Guard also provided wo-
men's auxiliaries. Id. Membership in these auxiliary corps did not entail full military status;
instead, the auxiliaries were subjected to rank structures, disciplinary schemes, and levels of
pay and benefits that differed from those of the regular military. Id.; see id. at 10-18 (providing
detailed account of stillborn plans to fully include women in Army in period between two
World Wars).
14. See ROcAN, supra note 8, at 131-34 (explaining that while women initially served only
at aircraft warning service posts, demand for their services soon spread throughout service
companies). Many of these women performed clerical and administrative duties. Id. at 134.
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(WAC) to facilitate greater efficiency in the functioning of the auxil-
iary services. 15 By the end of World War II, the WAC had been
deployed throughout every major U.S. military theater in the
world.16
B. The Creation of the Exclusions
In recognition of the contributions made by women, Congress
passed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, open-
ing regular active duty components of the military to ser-
vicewomen. 17 The Act, however, also established restrictions that
curtailed the total number of women permitted in the military and
placed a ceiling on the rank they could attain.18 It further contained
exclusions prohibiting the assignment of women to naval vessels
and combat aircraft.' 9 Although restrictions on the number and
rank of female military personnel were eventually lifted in 1967, the
statutory ban against women in combat remained encoded in law.20
Others held diversified positions ranging from jobs as airplane mechanics to weather observ-
ers. Id.
15. See generally Act of July 1, 1943, ch. 187, 57 Stat. 371 (establishing Women's Army
Corps for service in U.S. Army). The Senate Committee on Military Affairs recommended the
passage of the act by noting that the women's corps would be more effectively used if placed
on actual military status. S. REP. No. 45, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1943), reprinted in 1943
U.S.C.S. 2-128, 2-128; see ROGAN, supra note 8, at 132 (noting that creation of WAC enjoyed
widespread support).
16. See ROGAN, supra note 8, at 133 (stating that WAC was deployed in European theater,
Southwest Pacific, North Africa, Southeast Asia, China-Burma theater, and Middle East). The
greatest single deployment of WACs, consisting of 8000 women, occurred in Europe. Id The
Army Air Force was the largest user of WAC services, employing a total of 40,000 women. Id.
at 133-34. Regarding the competence and dedication displayed by the corpswomen, General
Douglass MacArthur once noted that he "moved my Wacs forward early after occupation of
recaptured territory because they were needed, and they were soldiers in the same manner
that my men were soldiers." Id. at 137.
17. See generally Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, ch. 449, 62 Stat. 356
(codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) (establishing WAC as part of regular Army and
authorizing appointment of women in regular Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps). During
congressional debate of the proposed Act, several members of Congress expressed admira-
tion for the performance of corpswomen in World War II. See 94 CoNG. REC. 4266 (1948)
(statement of Rep. McCormack) (asserting that women played important role in World War II
and should be made part of regular military establishment); id at 6968 (statement of Rep.
Brooks) (stating that WACs rendered able and magnificent service to nation during war); id. at
6970 (statement of Rep. Rogers) (contending that enlisted men felt women should be granted
permanent status in military based on their performance during war).
18. Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, ch. 449, §§ 102, 202, 62 Stat. 356,
357, 363 (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.). Under the act, the number of women in
each branch of the service was not to exceed 2% of the total enlisted strength of the respec-
tive branch. The act further prohibited women from attaining any rank above lieutenant colo-
nel in the WAC or above commander in the Navy. Id. §§ 104(d)(3), 203, 62 Stat. at 358, 363
(codified at 10 U.S.C. Supp. I, § 559(b)(1) (1988)).
19. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (setting out statutory combat exclusions).
20. See Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130,81 Stat. 374 (amending title 10 of United
States Code to eliminate certain restrictions on female officers in Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps).
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1. Inconsistent definitions of "combat mission"
Despite its enactment of the statutory restrictions, Congress, un-
fortunately, never explicitly defined the term "combat mission,"
leaving the interpretation of combat to the individual military de-
partments.21 Thus, each branch of the armed services has struggled
to determine the jobs and missions in which women are eligible to
participate.22 The Department of Defense addressed this lack of
clarity in a 1988 Task Force Report on issues concerning women in
the military.23 According to the Report, definitions of combat have
varied among the armed forces as military doctrines and technolo-
gies have changed through time. 24 Moreover, each branch has read
the statutory restrictions against women in combat as an indication
of congressional intent to shield women from the risks of enemy fire
or capture. At the same time, however, the branches have used dif-
ferent risk thresholds to determine which positions should be
opened to women. 25 These varying interpretations of congressional
intent have led to the closure to women of noncombat positions not
explicitly covered in the statutory restrictions. 26
21. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 9
(1988) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT], reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings, supra note
5, at 142 (noting that while Department of Defense has occasionally issued general guidance
regarding scope of combat exclusions, interpretation of statutes has been left to military
departments).
22. See Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that American
military has wrestled for decades with problem of whether and how to include women). In
Hill, the plaintiff joined the Army to become a nuclear biological and chemical specialist
(NBCS). Itd at 1231. In September 1982, after qualifying for the position and going through
substantial pre-training drills, the Army closed 23 positions, including the NBCS, to women
on the basis that the jobs would likely expose them to combat. Id. Hill was given an honora-
ble discharge. Id In October 1983, the Army reclassified the NBCS position as noncombat.
Id at 1232. The court held that closure of the position did not support a claim by Hill of
unlawful discrimination, and noted that the subsequent reopening of the NBCS position to
women indicated good faith on the part of the Army. Id. at 1242.
23. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text (summarizing Task Force Report find-
ings regarding varied interpretations of "combat" by different branches of armed forces).
24. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 9, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings,
supra note 5, at 142 (stating that differences in mission organization and operational practices
lead to varied definitions of "combat mission" by services).
25. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 9-10, reprinted in Women in the Military Hear-
ings, supra note 5, at 142-43 (asserting that differences among services in interpreting risk of
exposure to hostile fire or capture is of greatest concern to Department of Defense Task
Force). The Task Force Report clarified that the legislative histories of the statutory exclu-
sions support the notion that the exclusions were promulgated to protect women from such
risks, even though the risks of harm or capture are not explicitly mentioned in the statutes.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 9, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings, supra note 5,
at 142.
26. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 10, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings,
supra note 5, at 143. According to the report, the prohibition of women from such positions
goes beyond that suggested in the Secretary of Defense's 1985 communication to the armed
forces regarding combat exclusions. Id. The Secretary stated in 1985 that "[m]ilitary women
can and should be utilized in all roles except those explicitly prohibited by the combat exclu-
sion statutes and related policy. The combat exclusion rule should be interpreted to allow as
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In response to these inconsistent definitions of "combat mission,"
the Task Force Report recommended that the Secretary of Defense
issue guidance to the armed services clarifying this definition and
indicating the appropriate method of risk assessment to be used to
determine which noncombat duties should be closed to women.27
The Task Force Report noted that each branch of the service em-
ployed distinct assignment policies concerning servicewomen.28 At
this time, the Army used a coding system designed to integrate wo-
men into all positions except those involving the "highest
probability of direct combat." 29
The Navy, meanwhile, defined a "combat mission" as "a mission
of a unit, ship, aircraft or task organization which has as one of its
primary objectives to seek out, reconnoiter, or engage an enemy."30
The Marine Corps defined "direct combat operations" as "seeking
out, reconnoitering, or engaging in offensive action," and further
prohibited women from being assigned to positions involving the
greatest physical risk.3  Finally, the Air Force designated aerial
combat as "(1) [d]elivery of munitions or other destructive material
against an enemy, or (2) [a]erial activity over hostile territory where
enemy fire is expected and where risk of capture is substantial."3 2
The regulations also prohibited assignment of women to duties and
units "where there is a probability of exposure to hostile fire and
many as possible career opportunities for women to be kept open." TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 21, at 9, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings, supra note 5, at 142.
27. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 10, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings,
supra note 5, at 143 (asserting that use of risk assessment in decisions to exclude women from
noncombat positions merits special attention).
28. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 10-13, reprinted in Women in the Military
Hearings, supra note 5, at 143-47 (describing disparate assignment policies for women in
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps); infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (explaining assign-
ment policies of Army, Navy, and Air Force).
29. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 11, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings,
supra note 5, at 144. "Direct combat" is defined as follows:
engaging an enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to
direct enemy fire, a high possibility of direct physical contact with the enemy, and a
substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy
by fire, maneuver, or shock effect in order to destroy or capture, or while repelling
assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack.
Ia The Army's Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) System evaluates each position
(called Military Occupational Specialty or Area of Concentration) based on its specific duties
and on the tactical doctrine, mission, and location on the battlefield of the unit to which a
person filling that position would be assigned. Id. Women are prohibited from serving in
positions coded as P1, designating the highest probability of direct combat. IaL
30. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 12, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings,
supra note 5, at 145.
31. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 13, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings,
supra note 5, at 146.
32. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 14, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings,
supra note 5, at 147.
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substantial risk of capture."33
The Task Force Report recommended that the Secretary of De-
fense adopt a standardized rule on the use of risk in determining
positions for servicewomen.3 4 Under this rule, noncombat units or
positions would be closed to women only if the type, degree, and
duration of risk of direct combat, exposure to hostile fire, or capture
was as great in these units or positions as in the combat units regu-
larly supported by noncombat positions.3 5 Shortly thereafter, the
Secretary of Defense did adopt the rule along with other recommen-
dations directed to the service branches.3 6 The services responded
to the rule by revising their policies, resulting in the creation of ad-
ditional openings for women in the Army,3 7 Navy,38 Air Force,3 9 and
Marines.40
33. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 14, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings,
supra note 5, at 147. The report noted that closure of units or positions to women based on a
mere probability of exposure to hostile fire and risk of capture was not specifically required by
law. Id
34. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 10, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings,
supra note 5, at 143 (stating that risk threshold must bear a proper nexus to combat),
35. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 10, reprinted in Women in the Military Hearings,
supra note 5, at 143 (asserting that noncombat units or positions should be open to women if
risk associated with jobs is "less than [that associated with] land, air, or sea combat units" that
the noncombat positions support).
36. See Military Personnel Hearings, supra note 1, at 14, 15-18 (statement of Christopher
Jehn, Assistant Secretary of Defense) (outlining recommendations adopted by Secretary con-
cerning combat exclusions). Mr. Jehn noted that the Defense Department's adoption of the
"risk rule" standardized definitions of combat exclusions throughout the military and contrib-
uted to the expansion of career opportunities for women. Id. at 16.
37. See Military Personnel Hearings, supra note 1, at 25, 26-27 (statement of Lieutenant Gen-
eral A.K. Ono, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army) (stating reviews of Direct
Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) system in light of new "risk rule" opened over 23,000
positions to assignment of women).
38. See Military Personnel Hearings, supra note 1, at 31-34 (statement of Vice Admiral J.M.
Boorda, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Navy Personnel, U.S. Navy) (outlin-
ing changes in Navy's combat exclusion policies since issuance of Department of Defense
Task Force Report). The Navy redefined "combat mission" to mean "a mission of an individ-
ual unit, ship or aircraft that individually, or collectively as a naval task organization, has as
one of its primary objectives to seek out, reconnoiter, and engage the enemy. The normal
defensive posture of all operating units is not included within the definition." Id. at 32. This
new classification allowed the Navy to open three classes of ships, 24 ships in total, for the
permanent assignment of women. Id.
39. See Military Personnel Hearings, supra note 1, at 41-42 (statement of Lieutenant General
Thomas Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, U.S. Air Force) (noting that reviews of
combat-related positions have opened Red Horse and Mobile Aerial Port Squadrons as well
as numerous other aircraft squadrons to assignment of women). Red Horse squadrons are
units that specialize in civil engineering, including the construction and maintenance of land-
ing strips and other heavy construction projects. Women May Join Seabees, ENGINEERING NEWS-
RECORD, Mar. 10, 1988, at 23.
40. See Military Personnel Hearings, supra note 1, at 45 (statement of Lieutenant General
Norman Smith, Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps)
(stating that women now serve as Marine Security Guards and receive same training for defen-
sive combat operations as men).
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C. The Exclusions Since the 1970s
Despite this history of inconsistency in the application of the com-
bat exclusions, there was very little controversy surrounding the
prohibition of women in combat until the 1970s. The emergence of
the women's rights movement during this period sparked criticism
of the exclusions themselves and forced supporters to defend the
restrictive policies.41 Since that time, criticism has grown. The bat-
tle lines have not been drawn in the federal courts, however, be-
cause there have been few constitutional challenges to the
exclusions. 42 In fact, when combat exclusions have been addressed
in litigation, courts have mostly relied on them for support in up-
holding other challenged military policies and laws, such as those
41. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38
UCLA L. REv. 499, 529 (1991) (asserting that before rise of women's movement neither mili-
tary nor Congress perceived any need to provide justifications for combat exclusions). Pro-
fessor Karst notes that an expectation that the Equal Rights Amendment would be ratified
may have led the military to accelerate the opening of positions to women. 1d; see Jeff Tuten,
The Argument Against Female Combatants, in FEMALE SOLDIERS-COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBA-
TANTs? 237, 246 (Nancy L. Goldman ed., 1982) (identifying women's movement as impetus
behind women's changing role in military). For a discussion of the debate between oppo-
nents and supporters of combat exclusions, see Part II of this Comment.
42. See Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1238 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (commenting that
court has found no challenge to exclusionary statutes in reported case law). Despite the state-
ment of the court in Hill, it appears that there has been at least one case dealing with a consti-
tutional challenge to 10 U.S.C. § 6015, the federal statute that provides "women may not be
assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions .... 10 U.S.C.
§ 6015 (1988); see Kovach v. Middendorf, 424 F. Supp. 72, 79 (D. Del. 1976) (holding that
disparate classifications of men and women mandated by section 6015 do not violate female
plaintiff's equal protection rights). In Kovach, the plaintiff challenged a Navy policy that
granted a disproportionately low number of Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC)
scholarships to women as compared to men and established different eligibility standards for
men and women. Id. at 74. The plaintiff conceded that if the policy was deemed to be ration-
ally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, then the combat exclusion in 10 U.S.C.
§ 6015 would be constitutionally valid and thus appropriate for regulation of the Navy. Id. at
77. Recognizing Congress's broad power to provide for the national defense, the court held
that regardless of whether a strict scrutiny or traditional standard of review was applied, the
statute was constitutionally sustainable. Id at 79. Interestingly, the reason that combat exclu-
sions have generally not been challenged on constitutional grounds is because of a general
perception that such challenges would be futile in light of courts' customary standard of re-
view in military matters. See Robin Rogers, Comment, A Proposal for Combatting Sexual Discrimi-
nation in the Military: Amendment of Title VII, 78 CAL. L. REV. 165, 181 (1990) (asserting that any
challenge to combat exclusions on equal protection grounds would almost certainly fail due
to cursory review usually used in matters of military policy). For more on judicial deference
to the military, see Part IV of this Comment.
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involving mandatory discharge schemes,43 hair length regulations, 44
allocation of military scholarships,4 5 service entrance require-
ments, 4 6 and the selective service registration law. 47
Outside the federal courts, however, fierce debate has surrounded
the question of whether women should be prohibited from engag-
43. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,510 (1975) (upholding mandatory discharge
of appellee under 10 U.S.C. § 6382(a), which requires that male officers who have not been
promoted in nine years be discharged from service). After serving over nine years as a com-
missioned officer in the Navy, appellee was passed over a second time for promotion and
given a mandatory discharge under the statute. Id at 499. Appellee asserted that had he
been a female officer he would have been entitled by statute to thirteen years of commis-
sioned service before being discharged for want of promotion. Id at 500. Thus, he claimed
that application of the statute to him was unconstitutional discrimination based on sex, viola-
tive of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id The Court noted that combat
restrictions prevent most female lieutenants from compiling records of seagoing service com-
parable to those of male officers. Id. at 508. Male and female Navy lieutenants, the Court
continued, are not similarly situated and the statute granting females a longer period of ser-
vice is consistent with the goal of providing women fair opportunity for promotion. Id. at
508-09.
44. See Campbell v. Beaughler, 519 F.2d 1307, 1308 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that Marine
Corps' regulations setting different standards for male and female hairstyles do not offend
equal protection laws), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). Appellants, male enlisted Marine
reservists, challenged regulations that prohibited males from wearing hairpieces but allowed
females to wear short wigs. i. The military defended the regulations by arguing that wigs
present a safety hazard in their interference with gas masks and earphones used in mine de-
tecting units. Id Furthermore, the Marine Corps alleged that wigs interfere with the uni-
formity the Corps seeks to promote in its combat units. Id The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that prohibition of wigs for males is rationally related to the safety and
compatibility of the Marines. Id at 1309. The court added that its holding was reinforced by
the fact that, as a result of combat exclusion rules, female Marines do not train for combat,
wear gas masks, or operate mine detectors. Id
45. See Kovach v. Middendorf, 424 F. Supp. 72, 79 (D. Del. 1976) (denying plaintiff's
equal protection claim). The district court stated that a naval policy setting stricter eligibility
standards for women and granting a disproportionately high number of NROTC scholarships
to men is based on the fact that the Navy needs greater numbers of male officers than female
officers, because women are statutorily prohibited from serving on combat vessels. 1I at 77.
The court upheld the constitutionality of the combat exclusion statute and held that the schol-
arship policy was therefore rationally related to the provision and maintenance of the Navy, a
legitimate governmental purpose. Id at 77, 79.
46. See Lewis v. United States Army, 697 F. Supp. 1385, 1393 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (conclud-
ing that Army policy setting higher requirements for female enlistees does not violate due
process or equal protection standards). In Lewis, the plaintiff brought suit challenging an
Army and Army National Guard policy that provided foi the acceptance of a limited number
of male General Educational Development (GED) certificate holders into the service but re-
quired all female enlistees to be either a high school graduate or holder of a GED certificate
and fifteen hours of college credit. Id at 1386. The Army argued that because women are
prohibited from combat, a greater number of male than female soldiers is needed to fill troop
requirements, and thus different standards for male and female enlistees are necessary. Id. at
1391. The district court found that men and women are not similarly situated in the armed
forces because of the combat exclusion policy and, therefore, that it is not unreasonable for
the Army to impose stricter enlistment standards on women recruits. Id. at 1393.
47. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (upholding male-only registration
law under Military Selective Service Act). The Supreme Court found that the purpose of
military registration is to prepare for a draft of combat troops. Id. at 76. Because women are
not eligible for combat, the Court held that requiring only males to register for a potential
draft did not violate the Due Process Clause. Id at 78-79. For a more complete discussion of
Rostker, see Part IV of this Comment.
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ing in combat. Lawmakers, scholars, and military personnel alike
have contended that excluding women from combat substantially
impairs a servicewoman's opportunities for promotion to higher
ranks because the ultimate function of the armed forces is to engage
in combat. 48 Critics of combat restrictions also argue that the strat-
egies and technological advancements of modem warfare have
made the exclusions a relic of an outdated past.4 9 On the other
hand, proponents of the exclusions assert that these policies are in
harmony with the will of the American people.50 The supporters
also argue that combat restrictions are essential to the maintenance
of a strong national defense. 5' This argument is premised on the
belief that women are both physically and psychologically less suited
for warfare than men and, therefore, are unable to endure the rigors
of combat against enemy forces which would be almost certainly
48. See Mary Griffin, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII Remedy for Discrimination
in the Military, 96 YALE LJ. 2082, 2085 (1987) (stating that exclusion from combat precludes
servicewomen from many senior command positions); Military Personnel Hearings, supra note 1,
at 4 (statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder, Chairwoman, Military Installations and Facilities)
(asserting that combat exclusion closes many routes of advancement to servicewomen); id at
90 (statement of Capt. Priscilla Locke, U.S. Army, Personnel Distribution Officer) (stating
belief that wide range of job assignments and experiences necessary for advancement to
higher ranks is not available because portion of Air Defense Artillery branch is closed to ser-
vicewomen); id at 88-89 (statement of Capt. Kathleen Conley, U.S. Air Force, Instructor,
Department of Management) (contending that combat experience is core value of military
profession and exdusion from combat inevitably slows advancement to senior ranks). But see
id at 75 (statement of Master Sergeant Anne Wright, U.S. Air Force, Aircraft Load Master)
(commenting that her military career has never been jeopardized by restricted access to com-
bat positions); id at 75-76 (statement of Gunnery Sergeant Jane Justice, U.S. Marine Corps,
Aviation Enlisted Assignment Monitor) (asserting that her career opportunities have been
equal to those of male counterparts).
49. See 137 CONG. REC. S11,413 (daily ed. July 31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Roth) (argu-
ing that statutory restriction of female pilots in combat aircraft is as outdated in modem ser-
vice as World War II propeller plane); Women in the Military Hearings, supra note 5, at 75
(statement of Martin Ferber, Senior Associate Director, National Security and International
Affairs Division, General Accounting Ofice) (asserting that application of 40-year-old statutes
in context of modem warfare and changing role of women in society creates dilemma for
armed services). At the time the statutory exclusions were passed in the late 1940s, some
members of Congress believed that women lacked the physical strength to engage in combat
and that society would not tolerate placing women in such positions. Id. Today, changes in
equipment and strategies have made technical skills at least as important as physical abilities
in combat. Id Furthermore, the role of women in modem society has changed, enabling
women to pursue many careers that were closed to them in the late 1940s. Id Given these
changes, the statutory exclusions have become outdated. Id
50. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (explaining arguments used by sup-
porters of combat exclusions to support contention that exclusions are consistent with views
of American public).
51. See Tuten, supra note 41, at 261 (arguing that military's job is not to act as equal
opportunity employer but to provide for common defense). Tuten asserts that using the
armed services for societal experiments such as the integration of women into combat roles
places national security injeopardy. Id.; see Rogers, supra note 42, at 171 (noting that central
justification offered for combat exclusion is military necessity). Theorists who take this posi-
tion argue that use of female combatants would weaken national defense. Id. This theory is
premised on actual or perceived physical, psychological, and social differences between men
and women. Id.
1312 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1301
composed entirely of men. 52
While debate surrounding combat exclusions proliferated during
the 1970s, the issue did not become prominent in the public domain
because the U.S. armed forces saw relatively little large-scale com-
bat following the Vietnam War.53 Although women participated in
the United States invasions of Grenada and Panama, the type of
massive military operation needed to conduct a thorough analysis of
the arguments for and against the combat exclusions did not come
to pass during the 1970s or 1980s.54 This situation changed, how-
ever, in August of 1990, when the small, oil-rich, Middle Eastern
country of Kuwait was invaded by its larger neighbor, Iraq. 55 In re-
sponse to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President Bush ordered the im-
plementation of "Operation Desert Shield," a massive build-up of
troops and military hardware in the Persian Gulf region.5 6 Opera-
tion Desert Shield was designed to enforce economic sanctions im-
posed by the United Nations on Iraq, prevent further advancement
by the Iraqi military, and achieve the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi
52. See Tuten, supra note 41, at 261 (arguing that inclusion of women in U.S. combat
troops would hinder national defense).
53. The height of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam peaked in 1968 with nearly
525,000 American soldiers in that country. THE 1991 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 119
(Otto Johnson et al. eds., 1991). By the end of March, 1973, all American troops had left the
country. Id. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, America entered a more isolationist era,
due in part to domestic opposition to the War. See Bill Turque, Erasing the Vietnam Nightmare,
NEwSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1991, at 67 (describing Gulf War as potential catharsis for military and
nation in overcoming negative impact of Vietnam War).
54. One hundred and ten servicewomen were deployed during the invasion of Grenada;
600 participated in the attack on Panama. See 137 CONG. REC. S5900 (daily ed. May 15, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Roth) (summarizing American servicewomen's performance in hostile situ-
ations during 1980s). The invasions of Grenada and Panama were quick actions in which
United States forces encountered only minor resistance. See Dana Priest, Women at the Front,
WASH. PosT, Mar. 1, 1991, at Al, A31 (reporting that because Grenada and Panama involved
relatively limited combat, participation of women in complete array of operations necessary to
conduct war was not fully tested). These operations therefore provided an incomplete picture
on which to base a major analysis of women's role in warfare. Id.; see Military Personnel Hear-
ings, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Rep. Byron) (commenting that while invasion of Panama
broadened focus on women in military, Panamanian experience provides only part of
database for review of proper role of female combat soldiers).
55. See R.W. Apple, Jr., Confrontation in the Gulf. U.S. Set to Blockade Baghdad's Shipping, Iraq
Detains Foreigners, Upsets Summit, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al (detailing build-up of Desert
Shield operation in response to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait).
56. See R.W. Apple, Jr., War in the Gulf. The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1991, at Al
(detailing nations constituting allied forces which took part in Operation Desert Shield). The
following countries and cooperatives comprised the allied forces: Britain, Egypt, France, the
Gulf Cooperative Council (comprised of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab Emirates,
and Qatar), Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Argentina, Bangladesh, Ni-
ger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone contributed "smaller armed forces." Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, the Soviet Union, and Spain had "naval presences" in the Gulf War. Id. This Comment
discusses only the United States' role in the Persian Gulf War.
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forces.5 7 After gaining allied support and the approval of the
United Nations, "Operation Desert Storm" commenced in January
1991.58 The resulting Persian Gulf War provided an opportunity
for examination of the appropriateness of combat exclusions in the
context of a modem wartime situation.5 9 Ultimately, the experience
of U.S. servicewomen in the Gulf conflict has demonstrated that the
time has come to fully integrate qualified women into all areas of
military service.
II. THE WAR IN THE GULF-AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS
SURROUNDING THE COMBAT EXCLUSIONS
The involvement of the U.S. armed forces in Operation Desert
Storm provides a modem context for analyzing the traditional argu-
ments surrounding combat exclusions. The Persian Gulf War re-
sulted in the largest concentrated wartime deployment of uniformed
American servicewomen in United States military history.60 Ap-
proximately 32,000 of the 539,000 American troops sent to the Gulf
theater were women.6 1 During the conflict, women served with dis-
tinction, bravery, and courage.62 Five U.S. servicewomen were
killed in action, eight more lost their lives in nonhostile circum-
stances, and at least nineteen other women were wounded.63 The
following sections of this Comment analyze the major arguments
surrounding combat exclusions in light of the experiences of the
Persian Gulf War.
57. Id (describing deployment of forces in Operation Desert Shield); see supra note 56
(listing countries comprising allied forces).
58. See Rick Atkinson & David S. Broder, U.S. Allies Launch Massive Air War Against Targets
in Iraq and Kuwait, WASH. PosT, Jan. 17, 1991, at Al (describing initial allied invasion and air
strikes on Iraq and Kuwait).
59. See Priest, supra note 54, at A31 (quoting Lieutenant Colonel Michael Karpicus, Assis-
tant Director, Personnel Division, Department of Defense) ("[Women] were deployed as an
integral part of the overall Desert Storm effort, in every facet of combat support. That has not
happened before."). The role of women in combat can be examined in a detailed and realistic
way based on the more extensive combat experiences of servicewomen in the Gulf War.
60. 137 CONG. REc. S11,421 (daily ed. July 31, 1991) (statement of Sen. McCain).
61. Priest, supra note 54, at A3 1; see Amy Eskind, A Post-Gulf Memorial Day, 1991: Arms and
the Woman, WASH. POST, May 26, 1991, at D3 (stating that Persian Gulf War was first war in
nation's history in which women participated on grand scale).
62. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of bravery of female
soldiers during Gulf War).
63. See 137 CONG. REC. H2002 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1991) (statement of Rep. Rangel)
(honoring female heroes of Persian Gulf War). The U.S. servicewomen killed in action were:
Cindy Beaudoin, 19, of Plainfield, Conn.; Beverly Clark, 23, of Armagh, Pa.; Christine Mayes,
23, of Rochester Mills, Pa.; Adrienne Mitchell, 20, of Moreno Valley, Cal.; and Cheryl
O'Brien, 24, of Long Beach, Cal. Ia
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A. Physical Abilities and the Risk of Harm
A common theme advanced by those in favor of combat exclu-
sions focuses on the physical differences between men and women.
Supporters of the restrictions contend that women generally lack
the physical strength necessary for success in close combat.64 In
fact, several federal court decisions have relied on this belief in cases
involving women and the military.6 5 Strength, speed, and endur-
ance, anthropomorphic requirements that can be crucial to mission
success, are viewed as inherently male attributes.65 This position
not only reinforces the notion that the exclusions are necessary for
combat effectiveness, but also serves to justify the view that the re-
strictions are necessary to protect women from the risks of harm in
warfare. 67
Critics of combat restrictions counter that even if such physical
differences exist generally between the sexes, women should be
given the opportunity to meet specific physical tests for combat eli-
gibility rather than be subjected to a blanket exclusion.68 Further-
64. See Tuten, supra note 41, at 247-50 (asserting that women are inferior to men in
terms of physical requirements needed for ground warfare).
65. See Chandler v. Callaway, No. C-74-1249 RHS, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 1974) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (stating that physical strength is male characteristic and United States
must maintain military of males to physically equal forces of other nations); United States v.
Yingling, 368 F. Supp. 379, 386 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (stating that no amount of legislation will
alter innate and distinctive physical characteristics of men and women); United States v. Cook,
311 F. Supp. 618, 622 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (arguing that physical characteristics of strength com-
pel establishment of male armed forces); United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122, 124
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (allowing Congress to "follow teachings of history" regarding superior physi-
cal strength of man in establishing men as first line of defense while women "keep the home
fires burning").
66. See Tuten, supra note 41, at 247 (noting that in general men are larger, heavier,
stronger, faster, have greater endurance, and more muscle and bone mass than women).
Tuten contends that these sex-based attributes can influence combat-critical factors such as
the distance one can throw a grenade and the temperatures one can tolerate and therefore
mandate the exclusion of "weaker" women from combat. Id. at 147-48.
67. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing role of combat exclusions in
protecting women from harm).
68. See Mady Wechsler Segal, The Argument for Female Combatants, in FEMALE SOLDIERS-
COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS? HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 267, 271
(Nancy L. Goldman ed., 1982) (stressing importance of not equating average relative physical
strength between men and women with scenario where all men and no women are physically
capable). Segal contends that specific requirements related to combat tasks, rather than gen-
der, should constitute the selection criteria for combat eligibility. Id.; see Military Personnel
Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (asserting that selection for combat
should be based on compliance with certain standards rather than on gender). Representa-
tive Schroeder suggested that combat exclusions may actually weaken the military in the event
that not enough eligible men are found to fill all combat positions, because women are auto-
matically precluded from holding these positions. Id. at 3-4. Other commentators note that
physical differences between the sexes actually favor women for certainjobs. See Rogers, supra
note 42, at 172 (noting that small, agile women may be better able to maneuver in close
quarters than larger men); An Overview of U.S. Commitments and the Forces Available To Meet Them:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation of the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 398 (1983) (statement of Richard Hunter, Former Staff Director,
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more, the modernization of arms and the resultant change in
military tactics have altered traditional methods of combat to the
point where physical strength is often unrelated to mission suc-
cess. 69 The development of advanced weapons requiring technical
aptitude can greatly offset any physical disparities that may exist be-
tween servicemen and servicewomen.7
0
The events of the Persian Gulf War dramatically illustrated how
technological modernization affects combat. Even before any sub-
stantial close combat had begun, allied bombing raids inflicted mas-
sive losses on Iraqi forces. 7' Precision bombs were dropped from
safe distances by U.S. pilots and then guided by sophisticated laser
guidance systems to their intended targets.72 On the front lines,
American ground forces were armed with a "n6w generation" of
high-tech weapons. 73 The decisive allied victory in the Persian Gulf
War was achieved in large part through the superior technology and
training of the allied forces as compared to their Iraqi counterparts,
rather than by physical strength of individual soldiers during close
combat. 74
Military Personnel Policy, Office of Secretary of Defense) (noting that lower weight of female
pilots could allow loading of extra 50-100 pounds of fuel for aircraft carrier landings).
69. See Segal, supra note 68, at 272 (discussing modem tendency of military tasks to em-
phasize technical expertise over physical strength).
70. See Segal, supra note 68, at 272 (noting that many jobs on naval ships and combat
aircraft are not dependent on physical skills); see also Rogers, supra note 42, at 172 (asserting
that gun is great equalizer of physical differences in most close combat situations); Karst, supra
note 41, at 532 (contending that even Defense Department has abandoned argument that
women lack necessary physical capability for combat because modem warfare makes strength
irrelevant to most combatjobs); 137 CONG. REC. S11,413 (daily ed.July 31, 1991) (statement
of Sen. Roth) (stating that technology has put women on level playing field with men in air
combat).
71. See William Branigin, Iraqi Losses 'Horrendous,' Official Says, WASH. PosT, Feb. 20, 1991,
at A7 (reporting that air strikes and artillery barrages against Iraqi targets produced extreme
military and civilian casualties); Steve Coll, The Rout of the Republican Guard, WASH. PosT, Mar.
2, 1991, at A9, A10 (noting that aerial bombardment decimated front-line Iraqi troops); Bar-
ton Gellman & Rick Atkinson, Infrared Detection, Smart Bombs Said to Devastate Iraqi Armor, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 20, 1991, at A8 (stating that allied warplanes destroyed more than 100 Iraqi tanks
and armored cars per day with precision bombs).
72. SeeJohn Burgess, Videotapes Show 'Smart'Bombs in Action, WASH. PosT, Jan. 19, 1991, at
A17 (detailing accuracy and impact of advanced bombs with precision guidance systems on
Iraqi targets). Analysts noted, however, that these weapons sometimes fail in accuracy due to
electronic malfunctions or pilot error. Id, see Evelyn Richards, Lowdown on High-Tech Weapons
in Gulf War, WASH. PoST, Jan. 27, 1991, at A9 (describing guidance system of sea-launched
Tomahawk missile deployed at opening of war).
73. See Charles Lane, High Tech in Low Places, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1991, at 48 (noting that
while ground war with Iraq would likely be grueling and violent, allied forces were equipped
with various high-tech weapons and superior electronic battlefield reconnaissance). Many of
these weapons had not been tested in actual combat prior to the Gulf War. Id.; see Charles
Babcock, M-1 Tanks Quickly Demonstrate Superiority, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1991, at A28 (detail-
ing battle range and superior technological design of M-1 tank in comparison to Soviet-built
Iraqi tanks).
74. See Coll, supra note 71, at A10 (reporting that superior U.S. technology allowed allied
forces to attack and destroy Iraqi Republican Guard tanks without putting own armor at risk);
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Opponents of the exclusions contend that these same advances in
technology and strategy negate one of the combat exclusions' pri-
maryjustifications: protection of women from the risks of warfare. 75
Supply and logistical support units consisting of servicewomen and
servicemen are primary targets under modem battle strategies. 76
These units also become vulnerable to attack because they are often
required to advance into enemy territory to resupply front-line
troops. 7 7 In addition, the scope of modem weaponry is not limited
to combat positions and functions. As witnessed during the Persian
Gulf War, advanced weapons and arms are capable of traveling
great distances before striking intended targets. 78 The result is that
in contemporary combat conditions, the lines of battle are blurred,
and servicewomen are thereby placed in real-world danger despite
their legal exclusion from combat operations. 79
For example, Iraqi weaponry and allied ground tactics signifi-
cantly reduced the distinction between front lines and "safe" rear
lines. During the air battle, bases in eastern Saudi Arabia, located
hundreds of miles away from the front lines to the north, were the
targets of frequent Iraqi Scud missile attacks.8 0 Although the mis-
siles were often inaccurate or were intercepted by allied Patriot mis-
siles, one Scud pierced air defenses and struck a U.S. barracks in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 8' This attack, which killed twenty-eight
Col. David Hackworth, War and the Second Sex, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1991, at 24, 25 (stating that
poorly led Iraqi Army allowed itself to be defeated by allied technology). Colonel Hackworth
notes, however, that a future war might be "less hospitable to high-tech weapons. Ground
war is not dead." Id Colonel Hackworth also argues that women would be disadvantaged in
a more traditional ground war in which strength and endurance play a greater role. Id.
75. See Women in the Military Hearings, supra note 5, at 69 (statement of Martin Ferber,
Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting
Office) (asserting that success of combat exclusions in preventing exposure of women to risks
of combat is questionable due to complexity of modern warfare).
76. See Military Personnel Hearings, supra note 1, at 3, (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (stat-
ing that servicewomen in communication and supply lines are in area of great danger as cur-
rent battle doctrine of most countries is to knock-out these lines before attacking front lines).
77. See Women in the Military Hearings, supra note 5, at 69 (statement of Martin Ferber,
Senior Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Ac-
counting Office) (observing that women may serve in forward support battalions where they
may be injured or killed). On some temporary excursions, there is no limit to how far forward
servicewomen in support battalions may travel. i
78. See Segal, supra note 68, at 268 (observing that while thermonuclear attack is most
extreme example of how modernization of warfare can blur location of combat zone, condi-
tions of modern warfare routinely place people miles away from front into "lethal zone").
79. See Segal, supra note 68, at 268 (noting that modern warfare fails to differentiate
between front-line and rear-guard troops or even between military and civilian personnel).
80. See Guy Gugliotta, Scuds Put U.S. Women on Front Line, WASH. PosT, Jan. 28, 1991, at
A19 (detailing frequent Scud attacks on U.S. air base in eastern Saudi Arabia, hundreds of
miles from front line).
81. -See Dana Priest, Pennsylvania Mourns 11 Scud Victims, WASH. PosT, Feb. 28, 1991, at
A33 (detailing successful Iraqi Scud attack on U.S. barracks in Dhahran that killed 28
soldiers).
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Army reservists, resulted in the single greatest allied loss of the
war.8 2 In addition, numerous distant targets in Israel, a nonpartici-
pant in the allied war effort, were also subjected to Iraqi missile
attacks.83
Furthermore, on the ground and in the air, noncombat supply
and support troops were continually sent into hostile territory dur-
ing the allied campaign. 4 Factors such as distance, the desert envi-
ronment, and the allied attack plan forced the location of "rear"
supply depots closer to the front lines than many combat units.8 5
After the start of the ground war, female pilots routinely ferried
troops and supplies into areas not yet secured by allied ground
forces.8 6 American servicewomen suffered casualties while dutifully
performing these missions.8 7 The Persian Gulf War clearly demon-
strated that the protectionist goal of combat exclusions has been ef-
fectively neutralized by the ever-expanding modem battleground.
B. Pregnancy
Another argument raised by supporters of combat exclusions is
that the ability to bear children weighs in favor of excluding women
from combat. 8 Although the Pentagon rarely discloses precise sta-
tistics, estimates reveal that somewhere between ten to fifteen per-
cent of all servicewomen become pregnant each year.8 9 Genuine
concerns surround these figures, as supporters of the combat exclu-
sions contend that the American people will never allow pregnant
82. Id. Some of the reservists killed in the attack held duties generally unrelated to com-
bat; several were water purification specialists. Id Three of the reservists who perished in the
attack were women. Eskind, supra note 61, at D3.
83. See William Claiborne, Israel Reports No Damage in Scud Strikes, WASH. PosT, Feb. 3,
1991, at A26 (describing Iraqi missile attacks on targets in Israel covering approximately 350
miles).
84. See Priest, supra note 54, at Al (discussing flights of support troops including female
pilots over enemy territory).
85. See Molly Moore, Rear Guard Meets Front Lines, WASH. PosT, Feb. 18, 1991, at A32
(reporting that logistical factors and attack plan that varied dramatically from traditional war-
fighting doctrine exposed allied support troops to substantial risk). The logistical problems
posed by the rapid advance of allied forces during the ground war also required the rapid
construction of supply bases in Iraqi territory as that territory was being captured. Benjamin
Weiser, Fast Advance Poses Logistics Challenge, WASH. PosT, Feb. 26, 1991, at A9.
86. See Priest, supra note 54, at Al (stating that women regularly piloted Chinook and
Huey helicopters, and C-130, C-141, and C-5 planes on support missions, often into hostile
territory).
87. Eskind, supra note 61, at D3. Specialist Cindy Beaudoin, a medic in a support unit,
was killed by a land mine while trying to avoid an apparent attack. Sergeant Cheryl O'Brien,
an avionics mechanic, was killed when the helicopter in which she was riding was shot down
over enemy territory. Id.
88. See Tuten, supra note 41, at 251 (arguing that capacity of female soldiers to bear
children is another physiological factor weighing against assignment of women to combat).
89. Hackworth, supra note 74, at 27 (stating that pregnancy is perennial military problem
and that reports of pregnancy among servicewomen soared during Persian Gulf War).
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women to be sent into combat.90 Exclusion supporters contend that
pregnancy also physically limits women from performing certain
strenuous jobs.9 1 Thus, pregnancy is equated with nonavailability;
defenders of the exclusions posit that pregnancy prevents ser-
vicewomen from fulfilling their assigned duties and thereby impairs
the combat effectiveness of the entire military.92 Furthermore, the
financial costs incurred by replacing pregnant servicewomen in cer-
tain combat positions could be great.93
Critics of combat exclusions do not deny that pregnancy can in-
terfere with job performance. 94 They are quick to note, however,
that pregnant servicewomen are often held solely responsible for
their conditions in circumstances where the servicewoman has been
impregnated by a fellow serviceman. 95 The military's practice, ac-
cording to this argument, has been to consider the issue as a prob-
lem associated with the female soldier while averting blame from the
male soldier.96 In addition, critics of the exclusions assert that fe-
males should no more be excluded from combat service because of
their biological capacity to bear children than should males be ex-
cluded because of a propensity to succumb to certain illnesses or
disabilities. 97
According to some reports, the pregnancy rate of U.S. ser-
vicewomen involved in the Persian Gulf War was substantial.98
Some support units sent to the Gulf were understaffed in the early
90. See Tuten, supra note 41, at 251 (stating that while public's view has recently become
more liberal concerning women in military, it is unlikely society will ever tolerate presence of
pregnant women in combat).
91. See Karst, supra note 41, at 535 n.144 (identifying argument that pregnancy disables
women from performing stressful duties, thereby potentially interfering with mission
performance).
92. See Captain Carol Barkalow, Women Have What It Takes, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1991, at
30 (noting that military views pregnancy as equivalent to nonavailability of soldier).
93. See Hackworth, supra note 74, at 29 (observing that cost of training F-16 fighter pilot
is $6 million and that pregnancy would prevent female combat pilot from flying plane,
thereby necessitating costly training of replacement).
94. See Segal, supra note 68, at 272 (noting that contingency plans must be formulated for
reassignment and replacement of pregnant servicewomen when condition interferes with job
performance). Segal asserts, however, that women can continue to perform strenuous jobs
early in their pregnancies. Id.
95. See Barkalow, supra note 92, at 30 (noting military's tendency to consider pregnancy
as issue affecting women only).
96. See Barkalow, supra note 92, at 30 (arguing that servicemen are often held blameless
for pregnancy of servicewomen); Barbara Kantrowitz et al., The Right to Fight, NEwswaEEK, Aug.
5, 1991, at 22, 23 (quoting Rep. Schroeder) (commenting on high pregnancy rate on one
Navy ship in Persian Gulf and stating that "unless there was a star shining over that ship, I'd
say it takes two"). Schroeder further stated that blaming only servicewomen for pregnancy
while averting blame from equally culpable servicemen casts doubts on the adequacy of the
military disciplinary system. Id
97. See Segal, supra note 68, at 273 (contending that ability to bear children is no reason
to exclude women, just as ability to catch flu or venereal disease is no reason to exclude men).
98. See Hackworth, supra note 74, at 29 (stating that more than 1200 pregnant women
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stages of deployment because pregnant soldiers had to be left be-
hind.99 In addition, as military operations continued, the number of
servicewomen that became pregnant increased. 00 By mid-February
1991, over 1200 pregnant servicewomen had been evacuated from
the campaign.' 0
Before establishing that this argument justifying the combat ex-
clusions is conclusive, the problem must be put in perspective.
While proponents of combat exclusions view the nonavailability of
pregnant servicewomen as a justification for prohibiting the assign-
ment of women to combat positions,10 2 it is important to note that
more servicemen in the Gulf were unable to carry out their assign-
ments as a result of various nonduty-related injuries than were ser-
vicewomen because of pregnancy. 103 According to the head
physician at the triage center on Andrews Air Force Base, sport inju-
ries produced the greatest number of casualties among male U.S.
troops in the Gulf War. 104
C. Psychological Characteristics
Another argument often cited in support of combat exclusions fo-
cuses on alleged psychological differences between men and wo-
men. Proponents of the exclusions assert that women lack the
necessary psychological aggressiveness to succeed in combat.'0 5
Other observers question whether women can withstand the trauma
associated with the horrors of warfare. 10 6 Critics of the combat ex-
clusions respond to this psychological argument on several
had been evacuated from Gulf by February of 1991). One Navy report stated that
"[piregnancy is viewed as an epidemic." Id.
99. See Hackworth, supra note 74, at 27 (describing support unit from Fort Bragg that was
initially understaffed in Gulf because 13 pregnant servicewomen of company of 100 soldiers
remained in United States).
100. Hackworth, supra note 74, at 27.
101. Hackworth, supra note 74, at 30. One naval ship, the U.S.S. Arcadia, became known as
the "Love Boat" because 36 of its female crew members became pregnant. Id. Some ser-
vicewomen who were evacuated from the Gulf due to pregnancy rejoined their units after
giving birth, however, because they did not want to disappoint their units. Id.
102. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing "nonavailability" argument re-
lating to pregnant servicewomen).
103. Barkalow, supra note 92, at 30.
104. Hackworth, supra note 74, at 29 (relating findings of Colonel Robert Poole, physician
in charge of triage center on Andrews Air Force Base).
105. See Karst, supra note 41, at 533 (noting that men are more aggressive than women is
favorite argument of supporters of combat exclusions); Tuten, supra note 41, at 251-55 (ques-
tioning women's aggressiveness and fighting spirit). Tuten states that whether the causes are
genetic, chemical, or environmental, women in modem society are generally less combative
than males. Id. at 255. In his opinion, women would need to be "reprogrammed" to be more
psychologically suitable for warfare. Id.
106. See Hackworth, supra note 74, at 29 (noting that it is unclear whether women can cope
psychologically as well as men with wartime killing).
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grounds. First, they argue that any differences between the aggres-
sion levels of men and women are generalizations that ignore the
individual characteristics of particular persons. 10 7 Second, oppo-
nents of the exclusions suggest that these generalizations are rein-
forced by the fact that women are prevented from training for
combat.' 08 This alleged lack of aggressiveness has not prevented
women from working and excelling in other demanding fields such
as law enforcement and medicine. 0 9 Critics of the combat exclu-
sions deny that bravery under fire is dependent entirely on an ag-
gressive predisposition.1 0  Finally, opponents assert that
uncontrolled aggression is counterproductive to the modem sol-
dier, who must often be calm and technically proficient.' 11
Scientific and theoretical arguments aside, the Gulf War provided
numerous examples of servicewomen performing admirably under
conditions in which timid persons of either sex would likely have
faltered. For example, the Army awarded the Bronze Star to Lieu-
tenant Colonel Roslyn Goff who led 800 soldiers through Iraqi
minefields and inspired her battalion to excellence under fire." 12
Sergeant Kitty Bussell, armed with an M-16 rifle and a pistol, pro-
vided a show of force when Iraqi soldiers at a prisoner of war camp
rioted against unarmed guards.' 13 On entering the compound, Ser-
geant Bussell refused to yield to a Saudi interpreter who argued that
the situation was too dangerous for a woman, and she and the other
guards proceeded to quell the riot.114 Other servicewomen rou-
tinely flew refueling tanker planes deep into Iraqi airspace, well
within range of enemy surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft
fire.' 15 Women serving as military police on airbases in Saudi Ara-
bia vigorously maintained that they would forcefully meet any attack
107. See Karst, supra note 41, at 533-34 (contending that studies of gender and aggression
identify only average group tendencies, not individual tendencies).
108. See Rogers, supra note 42, at 173 (asserting that notion of females being less aggres-
sive than males is questionable because women might gain aggressive tendencies if actually
allowed to train for combat).
109. Segal, supra note 68, at 275 (contending that women have performed successfully in
many rigorous professional fields formerly closed to them).
110. See Karst, supra note 41, at 535 (arguing that aggression and courage are not synony-
mous). According to Karst, one need not be naturally aggressive in order to act with bravery.
Id:
Ili. See Karst, supra note 41, at 535 (contending that raw aggression can be counter-
productive in combat situations requiring technical skill).
112. See Molly Moore, Women on the Battlefield, WASH. PosT, June 16, 1991, at AI (detailing
Roslyn Goff's mission into enemy territory).
113. See Eskind, supra note 61, at D3 (discussing Bussell's actions during POW riot).
114. Eskind, supra note 61, at D3.
115. See Eskind, supra note 61, at D3 (summarizing air missions of Captain Anne Weaver,
who flew her refueling tanker as far as 250 miles into Iraqi airspace).
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on the bases where they were stationed. 1 6 While a quantitative as-
sessment of aggressiveness is elusive, certainly no one can question
the bravery displayed by U.S. servicewomen during the Gulf War.17
D. Societal Views, Stereotyping, and Public Opinion
Additional lines of defense surrounding the combat exclusions
center on the manner in which society symbolically views its female
members. One court summarized the traditional stereotype of wo-
men by stating that "men must provide the first line of defense while
women keep the home fires burning." 118 Proponents of this con-
cept contend that the country must protect women as the symbol of
motherhood."19 Civilized nations, the argument continues, do not
send their mothers and daughters to war.' 20
The logical extension of this idea is that combat exclusions are
imperative to national defense because images of women being
killed and captured in battle would so severely traumatize the Amer-
ican public that the nation's resolve to conduct war would be jeop-
ardized. 12' Consequently, military commanders would hesitate to
deploy combat units consisting of servicewomen due to a fear of
damaging morale and patriotism at the homefront.' 22 These as-
116. See Gugliotta, supra note 80, at A19 (noting resentment of military policewoman
when asked whether she would use her weapon if under attack). Though Iraqi forces never
ventured far into Saudi Arabia, several other servicewomen inierviewed stated that they would
not hesitate to open fire if the need arose. Id.
117. See 137 CONG. REc. S11,432 (daily ed.July 31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (de-
claring that victory over Saddam Hussein, Iraqi dictator, would not have been possible with-
out courageous service of women in the Gulf); 137 CONG. REC. H2002 (daily ed. Mar. 21,
1991) (statement of Rep. Rangel) (stating that heroic role women played in Persian Gulf for-
ever changed perception of female military capabilities); Hackworth, supra note 74, at 24-25
(asserting that bravery of women is not issue surrounding combat exclusion because Gulf War
proved heroism is not gender dependent).
118. Chandler v. Callaway, No. C-74-1249 RHS at 4-5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 1974) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file). In this case, the court upheld the constitutionality of differing edu-
cational requirements for male and female enlistees in the United States Army based on the
Army's combat exclusion. Id
119. See Karst, supra note 41, at 536 (identifying protection of women as symbols of femi-
ninity and motherhood as motivation behind combat exclusions).
120. See Rogers, supra note 42, at 175 (proposing that protection of daughters and wives
from horrors of combat is one fundamental reason for exclusion).
121. See Karst, supra note 41, at 536 (identifying concern that pain engendered by occur-
rence of female casualties will weaken national resolve and threaten military's mission).
122. See Karst, supra note 41, at 536 (highlighting concern shared by defenders of exclu-
sions regarding hesitancy on part of decisionmakers to deploy integrated combat units).
United States servicewomen have previously been held as prisoners of war. For a discussion
of an actual POW camp that housed United States servicewomen during World War II, see
HELEN ROGAN, MIxED COMPANY 258-71 (1981) (describing harsh conditions and heroism of
nurses in prison camp in Santo Tomas, Philippines). The lessons of Santo Tomas provide
some evidence that the existence of female prisoners of war can invoke troubling feelings of
guilt and anxiety among the American people and the military. Sixty-seven women spent
nearly three years in Santo Tomas under harsh conditions in which they sometimes resorted
to eating dogs, rats, and bugs for sustenance. Id at 258, 270. During the recapture of the
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sumptions are supported by the contention that policies prohibiting
women from combat are in accord with the will of the American
people. 123
The events of the Persian Gulf War have quieted many of these
arguments made by the proponents of the combat exclusions. Five
servicewomen were killed in action during the conflict. 124 Further-
more, for the first time since World War II, American servicewomen
were taken as prisoners of war.125 The predicted traumatization of
the nation, however, did not occur.126 Some public concern was ex-
pressed when the deployment of servicewomen who were also
mothers resulted in their separation from young children at home;
however, much of this concern was directed primarily toward chil-
dren of single-parent households in which the parent was sent to the
Gulf War. 127
Philippines, General Douglass MacArthur reportedly instructed his forces to advance to Ma-
nila as quickly as possible in order to free these women. Id MacArthur visited the camp after
its liberation and was apparently shaken by the condition of the prisoners. Id. But see Karst,
supra note 41, at 537-38 (stating that concern about female prisoners of war being subjected
to rape is well-founded). Karst argues, however, that the choice whether to assume this risk
should not be taken away from servicewomen through the combat exclusions. Id at 538.
123. See Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1238 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (observing that sex
discrimination in form of combat prohibitions is said to have approval of American public); see
also Military Personnel Hearings, supra note 1, at 24 (statement of General A.K. Ono, Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army) (asserting that Army regulations
prohibiting women from combat are in compliance with will of American people).
124. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (detailing deployment of American ser-
vicewomen in Persian Gulf War).
125. See Edward Walsh, "As Brave as Stallone .. .Beautiful as Brooke Shields", WAsH. POST,
Mar. 6, 1991, at A23 (describing specialist Melissa Rathbun-Nealy's tenure as prisoner of war
in Persian Gulf conflict). Rathbun-Nealy, captured after suffering bullet and shrapnel wounds
while driving a heavy-duty truck near the Kuwait border, was held for more than one month
by Iraqi forces and thus became the first American female POW since World War II. Rath-
bun-Nealy was apparently treated well in captivity and the experience reportedly did not
change her views that women should be deployed near combat zones in time of war. Id. A
second female prisoner of war in the Gulf conflict, Army Major Rhonda Cornum, suffered
wounds during a mission to rescue the pilot of a downed F-16. Eskind, supra note 61, at D3.
Cornum was captured when the helicopter carrying the rescue crew was shot down. Id. Five
crew members died in the crash. Id Cornum, a flight surgeon who volunteered for the mis-
sion, was held as a POW for one week. Id Critics of those who believe servicewomen casual-
ties would traumatize the nation argue that while it is tragic for women to lose their lives in
battle, it is tragic when any person is killed in war. See Kathy L. Snyder, An Equal Right to Fight:
An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Laws and Policies That Exclude Women from Combat in the United
States Military, 93 W. VA. L. REv. 421, 442 (1991) (questioning soundness of any nation's
decision to conduct war that risks only lives of its sons). The argument that the nation would
suffer great shock if women are killed in combat seems to suggest that women's lives are
worth more than the lives of young men, a position not seriously advocated by proponents or
opponents of the exclusions. Karst, supra note 41, at 537. This sentiment was echoed by the
mother of one of the servicewomen killed in the Scud missile attack on Dhahran, who re-
sponded to a question regarding the value of servicewomen's lives as compared to men's by
stating, "I don't think people really consider whether they're a man or a woman. I just say
they're a person." Priest, supra note 54, at A31.
126. See text accompanying infra note 131 (discussing nation's acceptance of women's role
in Gulf War).
127. See Opinion Watch, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1991, at 27 (reporting Gallup Poll showing that
1992] SERVICEWOMEN IN THE U.S. MILITARY 1323
The role of women in American society has evolved since 1948
when the statutory combat exclusions were first enacted by Con-
gress. 128 Despite contentions that combat exclusions reflect the will
of the people, public opinion polls indicate that Americans favor
some type of role for women in combat.' 29 One poll conducted by
the Gallup Organization four months after the allied victory in the
Persian Gulf revealed that seventy-nine percent of Americans be-
lieve that women should be granted combat assignments.' 30 This
sentiment, as expressed by the public during and after the Gulf War,
influenced those who are entrusted with national security. Follow-
ing the close of the War, the Department of Defense observed that
"one of the lessons we have learned from Operation Desert Storm is
the extent to which the Nation accepted the significant role of wo-
men in combat.' 3's
E. Unit Cohesion
Supporters of combat exclusions also argue that the assignment
of women to combat units would have a devastating effect on unit
cohesion. Commentators and military personnel assert that male
bonding among soldiers plays a crucial part in the success of a com-
bat unit.'3 2 Defenders of the combat exclusions argue that placing
89% of Americans were at least somewhat concerned with mothers leaving small children at
home when sent to Persian Gulf); Sally Quinn, Mothers at War: What Are We Doing To Our Kids?,
WAsH. Posr, Feb. 10, 1991, at Cl (questioning deployment of women who are mothers).
Quinn argued that many of these women did not fully grasp the implications of their decision
when they volunteered for service. Id at C2. The author also noted, however, that her con-
cern was not centered primarily on the mothers, but rather on their children. IdL Various
children's rights groups lobbied Congress during the war to pass a proposal urging the reas-
signment from combat areas, on request, of heads of single-parent families or of one parent if
both mother and father were sent to the Gulf. See Dana Priest, Military Reluctant to Alter Its
Rules, WAsH. PosT, Feb. 9, 1991, at Al (describing efforts of children's rights organizations
and military parents to keep one parent from each family out of combat zone and home with
children).
128. See Women in the Military Hearings, supra note 5, at 67 (statement of Martin Ferber,
Senior Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Ac-
counting Office) (asserting that role of women in society has changed dramatically since
1948).
129. See Military Personnel Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (quot-
ing New York Times/CBS poll dated January 13-15, 1990 showing that 72%o of Americans
believe "women members of the armed forces should be allowed to serve in combat units if
they wanted to and were qualified"); see Elaine Sciolino, Battle Lines are Shifting on Women in
War, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 25, 1990, at Al (citing poll).
130. Opinion Watch, supra note 127, at 27. Of this 79%o, 53% said that women should be
assigned combat duties only if they want them, while 26% responded that women should be
given combat duties on the same terms as men. Id. Only 18%o of respondents said that wo-
men should never be granted combat assignments. Id. The poll had a margin of error of plus
or minus five percentage points. Id.
131. 137 CONG. REC. Sl 1,423 (daily ed.July 31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (quot-
ing Peter Williams, Chief Spokesman, Department of Defense).
132. See Tuten, supra note 41, at 251 (arguing that military unit effectiveness is due more
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women into these units could destroy male bonding and, therefore,
interfere with a mission's success.' 33 Exclusion proponents allege
that assignment of women to combat units may create resistance
and resentment among the men, thereby damaging the spirit of the
fighting force.' 34 The ironic corollary to this contention is that the
men in the unit might also react by competing for the affections of
the women, thereby engaging in unnecessary risk-taking, overpro-
tecting the women, and diverting attention from a mission's
objectives.135
Critics refute these assumptions by noting that military experi-
mentation with mixed male and female combat support units has
demonstrated that the groups perform their duties with as much, if
not more, proficiency and esprit de corps as all-male units.136 For
example, when left to work out divisions of labor, mixed units have
fostered constructive competitiveness between and among the
sexes, which has led to increased unit motivation and efficiency.' 37
In addition, the intense personal bonds that promote heroism and
self-sacrifice within groups of closely-knit people are not necessarily
gender dependent, but rather form when group members of any sex
discover feelings of shared responsibility under stressful
conditions.13 8
During the Persian Gulf War, teamwork and mutual respect devel-
oped between servicemen and servicewomen.' 39 As with any opera-
to male bonding within combat groups than to acquisition of technical and military skills by
soldiers (quoting Richard A. Gabriel, Women in Combat? Two Views, ARMY MAG., Mar. 1980, at
44, 49)); Hackworth, supra note 74, at 26 ("Male bonding is an abstract thing, yet it is the glue
that holds fighting units together and allows them to do the impossible.").
133. See Tuten, supra note 41, at 252 (arguing that women should not be placed in combat
units until it is shown their presence will not detract from effectiveness of unit).
134. See Segal, supra note 68, at 279 (discussing alleged negative effect of female presence
on unit cohesion).
135. See Karst, supra note 41, at 536 (discussing argument that diversions and rivalries
created by female presence in combat unit would undermine heroism and self-sacrifice of
male unit members).
136. See Rogers, supra note 42, at 174 (noting that Air Force studies on effects of sexual
integration in combat support units cast serious doubt on question whether addition of wo-
men to combat units would interfere with group cohesion).
137. See Karen DeYoung, Danish Women Approaching Equality in Armed Forces, WASH. POST,
Sept. 21, 1987, at Al (chronicling Danish study that found that presence of women led both
sexes to become more competitive with their own and opposite sex and that after initial reluc-
tance, both men and women preferred mixed units).
138. See Karst, supra note 41, at 543 (arguing that close ties that form under stressful
conditions are not exclusive to male gender). Similar bonds-though perhaps of less intensity
than bonds formed among combat troops-can be found among members of male and female
sports teams. Id
139. See Molly Moore, Women on the Battlefield, WASH. PosTJune 16, 1991, at Al (reporting
award of Bronze Star to Lt. Col. Roslyn Goff for "inspir[ing] her [800-soldier] battalion to
excellence under fire" and stating that men's apprehension about her leadership were thus
proved unfounded).
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tion consisting of more than one-half million personnel, not all
servicemen emerged from the Gulf War with newfound feelings of
camaraderie for their fellow servicewomen. 140 A new relationship
based on respect derived from shared hardships, however, seemed
to develop between male and female soldiers in the Gulf.141 Ser-
vicewomen found that once their male counterparts saw that they
could work with as much dedication as any serviceman, the men's
initial doubts vanished and the servicewomen were quickly accepted
into the "team." 142 Before her death, Army Major Marie Rossie,
whose helicopter crashed in northern Saudi Arabia after the War's
end, stated, "I think if you talk to the women who are professionals
in the military, we see ourselves as soldiers.... What I am doing is
no greater or less than the man who is flying next to me."' 143
F. Lessons from the Persian Gulf War
The Persian Gulf War has shown that the policies excluding ser-
vicewomen from combat no longer serve a fully justifiable purpose.
Warfare has acquired a strikingly advanced nature that rewards the
possessor of superior technology. Technological advances, in com-
bination with current military strategies, thwart old-fashioned at-
tempts to protect women by segregating them from positions of
direct combat. Like their male counterparts in the Persian Gulf, ser-
vicewomen took great risks and performed heroically in hostile situ-
ations. Moreover, the American public recognizes the performance
of servicewomen and supports the opening of combat positions to
qualified servicewomen under certain conditions. 144
Congress should take affirmative steps mandating that all combat
positions be open to all competent servicemembers, regardless of
140. See Hackworth, supra note 74, at 26 (quoting Specialist Peter Cardin, XVIII Airborne
Corps) ("I was raised to protect the female. I couldn't handle being in a tank or infantry
squad with a woman. It would blow unit esprit and destroy male bonding.").
141. See Barkalow, supra note 92, at 30 (stating that nurturing relationship developed be-
tween men and women soldiers in Persian Gulf). Captain Barkalow, one of the first women
graduates of West Point Academy, volunteered to go to the Persian Gulf. Id. Barkalow noted
that the argument used against women regarding the importance of "bonding" in combat
units was used similarly against black soldiers before the Vietnam War, but "[w]hen the bul-
lets started flying, that argument went away pretty fast." Id. According to Barkalow, an analo-
gous situation developed in the Persian Gulf theater. Id
142. See Gugliotta, supra note 80, at A19 (reporting that successful performance of duties
by servicewomen fostered heightened cooperation between women and men).
143. Female Pilot, Three Others Die in Crash, WASH. PosT, Mar. 4, 1991, at A17. Major Rossi
piloted several supply missions into Iraq during the first hours of the ground war, transport-
ing ammunition and fuel to the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions. Id.
144. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (examining change in American opin-
ion that now favors increased role, including voluntary combat duty, for women in military).
Public opinion on the issue of nonvoluntary combat service by women, however, is an entirely
different matter. For a discussion of this issue, see infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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sex. The qualifying requirements for each position should be the
same for both genders. 145 Opening positions to women who meet
the given qualifications will provide the military with a larger pool of
qualified personnel from which to fill combat positions. 146 As out-
lined in the next section, Congress' recent changes in the statutory
combat exclusions represent a positive, albeit small, step toward
elimination of the outdated restrictions.
III. WINDS OF CHANGE
A move to repeal the statutory restrictions applying to female mil-
itary aviators was set into motion as a direct result of the profession-
alism displayed by servicewomen in the Persian Gulf War. 147 This
action culminated on December 5, 1991, when the President signed
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and
145. Currently, each branch of the service employs a system called "gender norming" by
which different standards are used to measure average physical abilities between men and
women. See Hackworth, supra note 64, at 25-26 (stating that gender norming by military is
complaint of both servicemen and servicewomen). Under gender norming, the standards for
achieving maximum fitness ratings are lower for women than for men. I In the proposed
situation in which women could qualify for combat positions, there should be one set of quali-
fications for all applicants to insure that each combat position is filled by the best person for
that position.
146. See Military Personnel Hearings, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (argu-
ing that combat exclusion laws weaken military by precluding use of qualified female soldiers).
Representative Schroeder makes a strong argument in support of the notion that exclusion of
women from combat weakens the armed forces. By automatically foreclosing combat posi-
tions to female recruits, the military is compelled to resort to a larger pool of male volunteers
to maintain a combat-ready force. Id. In order to attract the requisite number of men to fulfill
this pool, the military is forced to lower its eligibility standards, with resultant potential ad-
verse impact on the quality of the military. Id.; see also 137 CONG. REC. S 11,416 (daily ed.July
31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (maintaining that combat exclusions impair national
security by denying some women, despite superior qualifications, access to particular jobs).
147.- During floor debate over repeal of the statutory exclusions, members of the Senate
frequently alluded to the contributions made by women during the Gulf War. See 137 CONG.
REC. S 11,413 (daily ed. July 31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Warner) (pointing to Persian Gulf
War as lesson regarding contributions servicewomen can make); id at S11,416 (statement of
Sen. Kennedy) (asserting that women of Operation Desert Storm performed admirably in
combat situations and urging repeal of statutory restrictions relating to female pilots); id. at
S11,417 (statement of Sen. Glenn) (noting that interest in expanding role of women in mili-
tary is understandable due to women's recent competent performance in Persian Gulf con-
flict); id at S11,420 (statement of Sen. McCain) (declaring that excellent performance of
servicewomen was amply proven in Gulf War); id at S 11,429 (statement of Sen. Thurmond)
(expressing that Gulf War proves women can withstand stress of combat); id. at S 1,432
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating that performance of women in Persian Gulf demands re-
view of combat restrictions); id at S11,434 (statement of Sen. Roth) (asserting that Operation
Desert Storm indicates women pilots can successfully fly combat missions); id. at SI 1,435
(statement of Sen. Adams) (contending that Desert Storm shows that distinction between
combat and noncombat has no practical reality). Similar comments were made in the House
of Representatives. See 137 CONG. REC. H2003 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Swett) (stating that invaluable presence of servicewomen in Persian Gulf demonstrates time
has come to remove remaining barriers and promote women's full integration into armed
forces).
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1993148 into law. As part of the Act, Congress removed the legal
barriers applying to female pilots in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps.1 49 The Act also establishes a new Commission on the As-
signment of Women in the Armed Forces to study laws and policies
that restrict duty assignments to servicewomen.' 50 This Commis-
sion must issue a report of its findings to the President by November
15, 1992.151 In order to conduct assignment tests, the Commission
has the authority to temporarily waive any law or policy restricting
women from combat positions.' 52
While the repeal of the statutory exclusions applying to female
aviators is a positive step in expanding the role of servicewomen in
the military, the expansion is somewhat limited in scope.' 53 The
armed services are not statutorily required to use female pilots in
combat, but are simply no longer legally precluded from making
such assignments. 154 Furthermore, various concerned parties have
accused the Department of Defense of using the newly created
Commission as a tactic for delaying the opening of combat flights to
qualified servicewomen. 155 Viewed in this context, Congress is un-
likely to pass legislation requiring the integration of willing, able
women into other military combat positions in the near future.
148. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-
190, 105 Stat. 1290 (1991).
149. See id. § 531, 105 Stat. at 1365 (repealing prohibition on women flying Navy, Marine
Corps, and Air Force combat missions).
150. Id. §§ 541-542, 105 Stat. at 1365-66.
151. Id. § 543(a), 105 Stat. at 1367.
152. Id. § 550, 105 Stat. at 1370.
153. See 137 CONG. REc. S11,415 (daily ed.July 31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Roth) (stat-
ing that removal of statutory restrictions on female pilots will not result in dramatic changes
for women in military). Senator Roth likened repeal of the restrictions to "pinpoint laser
surgery" that would simply lift legal barriers and allow the military to decide how to best use
these personnel rather than "major surgery" that would reconfigure the composition of the
armed forces. Id
154. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No.
102-190, § 531, 105 Stat. 1365 (1991) to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (outlining changes in
combat flight eligibility). The federal law removing restrictions on female pilots in the Navy
and Marine Corps reads in pertinent part:
The Secretary of Defense may prescribe the kind of military duty to which such wo-
men members may be assigned and the military authority which they may exercise.
However, women may not be assigned to duty on vessels that are engaged in combat
missions (other than as aviation officers as part of an air wing or other air element
assigned to such a vessel) nor may they be assigned to other than temporary duty on
other vessels of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels of a similar
classification not expected to be assigned combat missions.
Id. § 531(b), 105 Stat. at 1365 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 6015). The restrictions on female
pilots in the Air Force were simply repealed. Id. § 531(a), 105 Stat. at 1365.
155. SeeJuanJ. Walte, Battle: Women in War, USA TODAY, Apr. 21, 1992, at 4A (reporting
that servicewomen and lawmakers have contended Commission is being used to delay place-
ment of female pilots into combat jets). The Secretary of Defense has decided to restrict
servicewomen from flying combat jets until the Commission concludes its study. Id.
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A primary reason for the Legislature's hesitancy, despite the pro-
fessionalism displayed by women in the Gulf War, is linked with the
question whether women should face the same combat liabilities as
men. 156 The American public has expressed doubt on the issue of
combat liabilities; only a minority of Americans feel that women
should be required to hold combat duty on the same terms as men. 157
In Congress, there is significant concern that opening combat posi-
tions to women will abrogate the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Rostker v. Goldberg.15 8 Rostker upheld the Military Selective
Service Act, a federal law requiring male-only draft registration. 159
The relationship between the assignment of women to combat and
registration or conscription of women under the Military Selective
Service Act has significant legal and political implications, as evi-
denced by the congressional-prescribed duty of the Commission on
the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces to study this issue
specifically.' 60 The relationship ultimately provokes the inquiry of
whether the statutory opening of all combat positions to qualified
women on a volunteer basis would lead the Supreme Court to elimi-
nate the male-only registration and draft law.
IV. LIFTING THE EXCLUSIONS: THE EFFECT ON THE DRAFT LAW
A. The Military Selective Service Act and Rostker v. Goldberg
The Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) confers on the Presi-
dent the authority to require every male person between the ages of
156. See Charles Moskos, Amy Women, THE AmTLnmc MONTHLY, Aug. 1990, at 71, 78 (stat-
ing that core question is not simply whether positions should be opened to women but
whether servicewomen should be given choice of whether they desire assignment to combat
role, a decision servicemen are presently not entitled to make).
157. See Opinion Watch, supra note 127, at 27 (citing Gallup Poll finding that only 26% of
Americans polled indicated that women should receive combat assignments on same basis as
men; 53% said women should be assigned combat duty only on voluntary basis; 18% re-
sponded that women should never be assigned to combat).
158. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
159. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76-79 (1981) (reasoning that registration of
only men for combat duty does not violate Due Process Clause because women are not eligi.
ble for combat service). The sensitivity of some members of Congress concerning the viabil-
ity of the male-only draft law was clearly demonstrated in recent debate. See 137 CONG. REC.
SI1,418 (daily ed.July 31, 1991) (statement of Sen. Glenn) (noting that assigning women to
combat duty may affect constitutionality of registration law); id. at S 11,421 (statement of Sen.
McCain) (stating that repeal of statutory restrictions might necessitate registering women for
draft); id. at S 11,431 (statement of Sen. Nunn) (raising question of whether women should be
subject to draft on same basis as men); id at S 11,435 (statement of Sen. Mikulski) (inquiring
whether allowing women to fly combat missions would lead to overturning of Rosther v.
Goldberg).
160. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-
190, § 542(c)(4)(B), 105 Stat. 1290, 1366 (1991); see Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 451 (1988) (defining congressional policy of maintaining adequate armed strength to
ensure national security).
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eighteen and twenty-six to submit to registration. 161 These men be-
come liable for training and service in the U.S. military should con-
scription of civilians become necessary to maintain the strength of
the armed forces. 162 Though the registration process was discontin-
ued in 1975, PresidentJimmy Carter sought its reactivation after the
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1980.163 Subsequently, Presi-
dent Carter requested that Congress amend the MSSA to permit the
registration of both men and women and asked that the funds neces-
sary for their registration be transferred to the Selective Service Sys-
tem.' 4 After lengthy consideration of the issue, Congress opted
not to amend the Act as President Carter requested, and instead
allocated only the funds required for the registration of young
men.165
1. The equal protection challenge
The reactivation of male-only registration was immediately chal-
lenged on equal protection grounds by a class of male plaintiffs who
were subject to obligations under the MSSA. 166 Three days before
implementation of registration, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that because the govern-
ment failed to meet its burden ofjustifying the gender-based classi-
fications of the Act, the MSSA unconstitutionally discriminated
between men and women.' 67 After examining recent Supreme
Court decisions, the court concluded that the appropriate standard
of review for gender-based classifications was the "important gov-
ernment interest" test articulated by the Supreme Court in Craig v.
Boren.168 According to this test, a gender-based classification can
161. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1988).
162. Id. § 451.
163. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 60 (1981) (stating that crisis in Southwestern
Asia led President to conclude that circumstances were appropriate to reestablish registration
in interest of national security). In 1948, the President was granted authority to induct regis-
trants into the military. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 4(a), 62 Stat. 604,
605-06 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 451). This presidential authority was ex-
tended until 1971, when Congress moved to preclude conscription afterJuly 1, 1973, thereby
mandating congressional action for any future draft. Amendments to the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 92-129, § 101(a)(35), 85 Stat. 348, 353 (1971) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 467(c) (1988)).
164. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 60.
165. d at 61.
166. See id at 61-64 (detailing lawsuit's long history prior to reaching Supreme Court). In
addition to the equal protection challenge, the plaintiffs further alleged that the MSSA im-
posed involuntary servitude on young males, abridged freedoms of expression and assembly,
and constituted deprivation of property without due process of law. Id. at 64 n.2. These
claims were eventually dismissed, leaving only the equal protection claim. Id.
167. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 57, 63
(1981).
168. See Goldberg, 509 F. Supp. at 593 (setting forth intermediate scrutiny test that requires
1992] 1329
1330 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1301
withstand an equal protection challenge only if the classification is
shown to bear a substantial relationship to an important govern-
mental interest. 169 Applying this test, the district court held that the
total exclusion of women from military registration did not serve an
important government objective and was not substantially related to
any alleged governmental interest. 170
2. The Supreme Court decision: Rostker v. Goldberg
Prior to the Supreme Court's consideration of the issue, there was
speculation that the complete exclusion of women from military re-
gistration could not survive middle-tier equal protection scrutiny
under Craig.'7 1 This speculation was dashed when the district
court's ruling was quickly reversed by the United States Supreme
Court in Rostker v. Goldberg.'72 The Court's decision in Rostker
demonstrated that customary modes of constitutional review do not
always apply in matters involving the armed forces.' 73
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Rostker does not elucidate the pre-
cise standard of review used by the Court to evaluate the gender
classification.' 74 In response to the Solicitor General's argument
gender classifications to bear close and substantial relationship to important governmental
objectives) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
169. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In Craig, the Supreme Court struck down
an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2%-alcohol beer to males under the age of 21
and to females under the age of 18. Craig, 429 U.S. at 192, 210.
170. See Goldberg, 509 F. Supp. at 605 (asserting that although military flexibility in partic-
ular emergencies may require under-utilization of female inductees, complete exclusion of
women from pool of registrants is counterproductive).
171. See Note, Women and the Draft: The Constitutionality ofAl-Male Registration, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 406,418 (1980) (suggesting that categorical exclusion of women registrants reflects gen-
eral sexism rather than prudent military decisionmaking). In light of valuable contributions
that women have made to the military, continued exclusion would not likely survive middle-
tier scrutiny under Craig. Id.
172. 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981). The Supreme Court decided Rostker less than a year after the
district court's decision. Id. at 57.
173. See S. REP. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 159-60 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2612, 2649-50 (asserting that Supreme Court's most recent equal protection
decisions cannot be read in isolation from opinions granting Congress great deference in
management of military); Linda E. Bloch, Equal Protection-Due Process-Provisions of Military
Selective Service Act Authorizing Registration of Males but Not Females, Do Not Violate the Fifth Amend-
ment, 59 U. DEr.J. URB. L. 241, 248 (1982) (noting that in assessment of male-only registra-
tion it is not enough to simply apply Craig standard without allowing for judicial deference in
areas implicating national security). The Senate report states that "[t]he Court has made it
unmistakably clear that even our most fundamental constitutional rights must in some circum-
stances be modified in the light of military needs, and that Congress' judgment as to what is
necessary to preserve our national security is entitled to great deference." S. REP. No. 826, at
159-60. For further discussion ofjudicial deference in military matters, see infra notes 184-93
and accompanying text.
174. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1981) (resisting Solicitor General's at-
tempts to pigeonhole Court's due process analysis); Bloch, supra note 173, at 249 (suggesting
that majority opinion, appeared to intentionally obscure standard of review). The Court's
analysis of the means prong of the Craig test was no more stringent than a rational basis
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that the rational relationship test be used, 17 5 the Court noted that
degrees of deference and levels of scrutiny can easily "become facile
abstractions used to justify a result."' 76 The Court asserted, how-
ever, that raising and supporting armies is an important governmen-
tal interest,177 and that exempting women from combat is not only
sufficiently but closely related to Congress' purpose in authorizing
registration. 178
Specifically, the Court determined that the issues of registration
and conscription are intrinsically linked because the sole purpose of
registration is to provide a pool of potential inductees for the
draft.1 79 Furthermore, the Court opined that any future draft would
be premised on a need for combat troops. °80 The Court deter-
mined, therefore, that the purpose of registration is "to prepare for
a draft of combat troops."'"" Although the Constitution mandates that
Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly, the Court con-
cluded that men and women are not similarly situated for purposes
of draft registration because of statutory restrictions excluding wo-
men from combat.' 8 2 Thus, the Court found that Congress' deci-
sion to register only men did not violate the Due Process Clause.183
B. Judicial Review in Matters Involving the Military
The decision in Rosther, as well as any examination concerning the
effect that assignment of women to combat units would have on the
draft registration law, must be understood in the context of the
great deference the judiciary affords to the legislature in matters in-
scrutiny. Id.; see also Snyder, supra note 125, at 427 (stating thatJustice Rehnquist equivocated
about standard used to review MSSA).
175. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 69. The rational relationship test would require that the Court
"scrutinize the MSSA only to determine if the distinction drawn between men and women
bears a rational relation to some legitimate Government purpose." IdL
176. Id. at 69-70. The Court asserted that further refinement in the applicable tests would
not advance certainty in the law, and suggested that "[slimply labeling the legislative decision
'military' on the one hand or 'gender-based' on the other does not automatically guide a court
to the correct constitutional result." Id.
177. Id. at 70.
178. ld at 79. But cf. Bloch, supra note 173, at 250 (contending that Court's equal protec-
tion analysis in Rosiker was premised on only enough evidentiary support to satisfy rational
relationship test).
179. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 75 (stating that only those registered can be drafted). The
Court observed that during debate on the registration law, Congress had clearly linked the
need for registration with anticipation of a subsequent draft. Id.
180. Ia at 76. The Court noted that Congress' findings concerning the draft and combat
troops were substantial enough to preclude independent study by the courts. Ia
181. Id (emphasis in original).
182. Id at 78, 79.
183. See id at 78-79 (stating that congressional and executive decision restricting women
from combat "fully justifies Congress in not authorizing their registration" for draft). This is
an instance that reflects the fact that men and women simply are not similarly situated. Id. at
79.
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volving the armed services. The United States Constitution grants
Congress broad powers over the creation, maintenance, and regula-
tion of the military.18 4 On at least one occasion, the Supreme Court
has noted that these powers reflect an explicit grant of plenary au-
thority by the Framers of the Constitution to Congress in matters
involving the armed forces.' 85
Accordingly, the Court has often declined to interfere in matters
it views as affecting military affairs and national security. As a result,
a sweeping form of deference has appeared in cases ranging from
basic free speech issues' 8 6 to cases involving the burning of Selec-
tive Service registration certificates 87 and the banning of homosex-
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-16. In these clauses, Congress is granted the power to
"declare War,... raise and support Armies .... provide and maintain a Navy; ... make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;... provide for calling forth
the Militia... provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia.. . "
185. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (stating that Framers of Constitu-
tion dearly contemplated that Congress have plenary authority over creation and mainte-
nance of military). Because many of the Framers were themselves military men who were
familiar with the differences between military and civilian life, the Court suggested that the
Framers had anticipated issues similar to those raised in Chappell and had incorporated solu-
tions in the Constitution. Id. at 300-01. The respondents in Chappell brought an action
against their superior officers, alleging that they received threats, low evaluations, undesirable
duty assignments, and unusually harsh disciplinary measures because of their minority race.
Id. at 297. After observing that Congress had not provided a damages remedy for claims by
military personnel against superior officers for violations of their constitutional rights, the
Court stated that anyjudicial action would undermine congressional authority in this area. Id.
at 304. Although common law causes of action by military subordinates against their superi-
ors had been entertained in the past, the Court asserted that the establishment of a modern
military justice system prevents such actions. See id. at 305 n.2 (distinguishing Dinsman v.
Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1852)). Dinsman recognized the existence of a firmly-rooted
common law action by servicemen against commanding officers for damages suffered from
punishment, and differed from Chappell by not requesting the Court to imply new causes of
action. Id.; Dinsman, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 401-03. Thus, the Court in Chappell held that mili-
tary personnel could not maintain suits for damages against superior officers for alleged con-
stitutional violations. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305.
186. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-40 (1975) (upholding military regulation ban-
ning speeches, demonstrations, and distribution of partisan political literature on military res-
ervation). The Court held that respondents, political candidates of the People's Party and
Socialist Workers' Party, had no generalized constitutional right to make speeches or dis-
tribute leaflets on the base. Id at 832, 838-40. Furthermore, the Court stated that there is
nothing in the Constitution that stops military commanders from acting to prevent what they
perceive to be "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under
their command." Idl at 840. Unlike public streets and parks which have traditionally served
as havens for free speech and assembly, federal military institutions are not places where First
Amendment liberties are rigorously protected. Idl; see also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353
(1980) (sustaining Air Force regulation prohibiting servicemembers from circulating petition
without approval of base commander). The Court in Brown stated that the Air Force regula-
tion was valid for the same reason that the Army regulations were upheld in Spock. Id.
187. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968) (upholding respondent's con-
viction for violating law requiring selective service registrants to have personal possession of
registration certificates at all times). O'Brien burned his card to protest the Vietnam War. Id.
at 369. In affirming the statute under which O'Brien was convicted, the Court deferred judg-
ment to Congress' broad powers to make laws concerning the raising and supporting of ar-
mies. Id at 377.
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uals from the military.18 8 The hesitancy on the part of the judiciary
to review military decisions closely was effectively summarized by
the Supreme Court in Orloffv. Willoughby.'8 9 After refusing to review
whether a petitioner's duty assignment fell within the specialist cate-
gory mandated by his status as a doctor, the Court stated that
"judges are not given the task of running the Army.' 190
At the heart of this assertion is the Supreme Court's self-per-
ceived lack of competence to review policies that relate to military
functions, organization, and control. 19 1 Thus, when the Supreme
Court reviews discrimination claims against the armed forces, it con-
sistently concludes that the military is a community apart from civil-
ian society whose judgments are the ultimate responsibility of the
188. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,466 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding Army regula-
tion making admitted homosexuality cause for mandatory discharge), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1004 (1990). After invoking Supreme Court precedent holding that there is no fundamental
right to engage in sodomy, the Seventh Circuit stated that it was "unwilling to substitute a
mere judge-made rule for the Army's regulation- ... " Id
189. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
190. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953). In Orlof, the petitioner was inducted
into the Army pursuant to a statute authorizing the conscription of "medical and allied spe-
cialist categories." Ia at 84. The petitioner, when required to complete a loyalty certificate,
refused to disclose whether he had ever been a member of any communist organization. Id. at
89-90. Petitioner was therefore denied commission as an officer and assigned to laboratory
technician work. Ia at 83-86. In response, the petitioner argued that denial of a commission
violated his rights because physicians and other specially qualified personnel were usually
entitled, upon induction, to privileged rank. Id. at 85. The petitioner consequently brought
action against the Army, seeking either a commission or a discharge. Id at 87. In refusing
this appeal, the Court stated that the responsibility for establishing procedures through which
such grievances can be settled lies with Congress and with the President, not with the courts.
IA at 93-94. The Court also refused to revise petitioner's duty orders, stating that "[o]rderly
government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army
matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters." Ide at 94.
191. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (acknowledging that courts have less
competence in military matters than in any other governmental sphere). In Gilligan, respon-
dents brought an action seeking: (1) injunctive relief restraining the Governor of Ohio from
"prematurely" ordering National Guard troops into action during future civil disorders and
preventing Guard leaders from future violations of students' constitutional rights; and (2) a
declaratory judgment holding section 2923.55 of the Ohio Revised Code unconstitutional for
insulating law enforcement personnel from liability for using "necessary and proper force" in
riots. Ia at 3. This action arose from a May 1970 incident at Kent State University in which
the National Guard injured and killed a number of students. Id The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit narrowed the respondents' cause of action to whether there is a
pattern of training, weaponry, and orders in the Ohio National Guard that makes use of lethal
force inevitable in situations where such use is ordinarily unnecessary. Morgan v. Rhodes,
456 F.2d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue but held that no justiciable controversy was
presented. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11. The Court noted that the Constitution vests authority for
training the militia in the states according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. Id. at 6,
10 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16). The Court further stated that decisions as to the
training and control of a military force are militaryjudgments subject to control by the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that "[i]t is this
power of oversight and control of military force by elected representatives and officials which
underlies our entire constitutional system -... " Id at 10.
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elected branches of Government.1 92 This judicial philosophy ulti-
mately bestows sweeping judicial deference on Congress regarding
issues involving the armed forces. 193
C. Rostker's Broadening of the Deference Doctrine
In Rostker v. Goldberg,194 the Supreme Court demonstrated great
sensitivity to this doctrine of deference to congressional decisions
regarding the military. 195 Before evaluating the merits of the consti-
tutional challenge in Rostker, the Court went to substantial lengths
to summarize its prior decisions outlining the wisdom of the legisla-
tive branch in matters involving the armed services. 196 To accentu-
ate this point, the Court specifically noted that the registration
process falls within Congress' authority over national defense and
military affairs, an area in which the legislature has enjoyed the ut-
most judicial deference. 197
The degree of latitude afforded to Congress in Rostker can best be
contextualized by recognizing that Congress' refusal to register wo-
192. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (recognizing that military's unique
disciplinary system coupled with congressional initiatives differentiates armed services from
civilian society); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (reiterating Court's long-standing
recognition of military as specialized society governed by its own laws and traditions); Orloff
v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (characterizing military as specialized community sub-
ject to separate discipline from civilian society).
193. See Chappel, 462 U.S. at 301 (noting that courts have acted in conformity with view
that Congress has plenary authority in military matters); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,
510 (1975) (observing that responsibility for determining how armed forces should best main-
tain military readiness rests with Congress); Parher, 417 U.S. at 756 (explaining that Congress
is permitted to legislate with more breadth and greater flexibility when prescribing rules for
military than when making rules for civilian society). Judicial deference in matters involving
the military, however, has been criticized by some scholars as bordering on judicial abdica-
tion. See Karst, supra note 41, at 564 (stating that "[ifn the last two decades the idea that
judges have virtually nothing to say about any issue involving the military has grown like a
weed"). Although a certain degree ofjudicial reluctance to interference in the armed serv-
ices' daily operation is necessary for the military to carry out its assigned functions, there is a
danger that this deference may constitute relinquishment of judicial authority by judges
predisposed to granting Congress broad constitutional immunities in matters involving the
military. Jed at 564-65. Some fear that this deference is tantamount to creating a military
exception to the Bill of Rights. Id. at 565; see Griffin, supra note 48, at 2104-05 (contending
that despite courts' alleged lack of expertise in military matters, responsibility for assessing
constitutionality of discrimination claims rests with judiciary). Griffin points out that the
courts have not demonstrated any greater competence in sensitive areas such as prisons and
government employment, and yet the judiciary has not approached claims in these settings
with the same deference provided to military matters. Id. at 2104.
194. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
195. See Karst, supra note 41, at 566 (asserting that extreme form of deference demon-
strated by the Court in Rostker carried "principle of deference to new heights").
196. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-68 (1981) (tracing line of cases establishing
principle ofjudicial deference in national defense and military affairs).
197. Id. at 64-65. The Court stated that "[t]his is not, however, merely a case involving
the customary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case arises in the context of
Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area
has the Court accorded Congress greater deference." Id.
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men was contrary to the expressed requests and recommendations
of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and high-ranking mem-
bers of the military. 198 Despite this input from the executive branch
and the military urging registration of females, the Court found the
general, overall legislative history behind the congressional decision
not to register women as sufficient to determine that Congress had
adequately considered the issue before acting.' 99 The Court em-
phasized that Congress had considered and debated alternatives to
male-only registration, 200 was aware of statistics presented by wit-
nesses concerning military strength,201 and was sensitive to current
opinions regarding women in the armed forces. 20 2 This degree of
deference and cursory review of congressional decisionmaking ap-
parent in Rostker is a crucial consideration when analyzing whether
198. See HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., PRESIDENTIAL RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR SELECTIVE SERVICE REFORM 23 (Comm. Print 1980) (concluding that women
should be subject to registration, induction, and training for service in U.S. military). Presi-
dent Carter advanced three arguments to explain why women should be registered and made
eligible for the draft: (1) women already constitute a large segment of the military and have
proved they could perform their duties well; (2) an amendment of the Selective Service Act
permitting the registration of women would double the size of the pool of persons available to
be drafted and would free men for combat jobs in the event of a draft; and (3) a male-only
induction would be inequitable. L at 22. According to the President, equity would be
achieved "when both men and women are asked to serve in proportion to the ability of the
Armed Forces to use them effectively." Id- at 23. Like the President, members of the military
and Defense Department were willing to advocate the registration of women, albeit to a lesser
extent. See Department of Defense Authorizationfor Appropriationsfor Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings on S.
2294 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1980) [hereinafter
Hearings on S. 2294] (statement of Secretary Brown, Department of Defense) (opposing con-
scription of women but acknowledging that registering women reduces risk of constitutional
challenges to future drafts). According to Secretary Brown, conscription of women is unnec-
essary as long as voluntary enlistment provides an adequate level of women in the military. Id.
Conscription of women would be effective, however, in preemptively preventing injunctions
that could delay peacetime and emergency drafts. Id.; see also id. at 171 (statement of General
Clifford Alexander, Secretary of the Army) (asserting that registration of women would not
mean that they would be drafted in event of conscription but merely assists military in deter-
mining women's location during period of mobilization). But see Department of Defense Authoriza-
tion for Appropriationsfor Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 6495 [H.R. 6974]
Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1009 (1980) (statement of Gen-
eral Bernard Rogers, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command) (contending that wo-
men should be registered and made eligible for conscription as matter of equity and to bolster
total pool of persons available for draft).
199. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 74-75 (reasoning that because Congress thoroughly consid-
ered the application of MSSA to women, legislative history is highly relevant in assessing
constitutional validity of women's exemption from registration). The Court noted that when
congressional action is challenged on equal protection grounds, the Court's task is merely to
determine whether the action denies equal protection of the laws. Id. It is not the Court's
function to retroactively interpose itself into the debate and choose an alternative action. Id.
at 70.
200. Id. at 70.
201. Id. at 71.
202. See id at 71 (stating that when Congress fully considers facts and current public opin-
ion regarding registration of women, Congress' broad powers to raise and support armies
should not be trumped by judiciary).
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the elimination of the combat exclusions would jeopardize the con-
stitutionality of the male-only registration law.
D. The Future of Rostker
It is argued that the demise of combat exclusions will require wo-
men to submit to draft registration, because with the legal barriers
removed, women would be similarly situated to men.20 3 This hy-
pothesis is misplaced. The enactment of carefully-considered legis-
lation allowing for the voluntary assignment of women to combat
positions, but expressly intending not to disturb the existing Selec-
tive Service law, would not invalidate Rostker. Assuming that any fu-
ture draft would still be premised on a need for combat troops, the
fact that women could refuse combat assignment while men could
not suggests that men and women would still not be similarly situ-
ated for purposes of a draft. 2 4 Given the unparalleled deference
granted to Congress by the Court in matters of national defense, it
is unlikely that such a law would be overturned on equal protection
grounds. There is no indication that the Court is moving toward
stricter judicial scrutiny in areas involving the military.20 5 Further-
more, if recent congressional debate and activity is any indication,
future laws altering the combat exclusions will likely be the product
of the same type of legislative debate and sensitivity to current opin-
ion that the Court approved of in RostkerY °6
V. CONCLUSIONS-BEYOND THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS
It is time to open all areas of military service, including combat
203. Snyder, supra note 125, at 428; see supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing
affect repeal of exclusions would have on draft law).
204. The drafting of large numbers of people who could then refuse combat assignment
could have severe consequences for national security. See Hearings on S. 2294, supra note 198,
at 95 (statement of Sen. Nunn) (identifying problem of drafting noncombat personnel in
emergency situations). Senator Nunn noted that the availability of training facilities is a limit-
ing factor that influences the number of people the military can assign to active service. Id. If
the facilities are used to train personnel who ultimately may not enter into combat, the total
number of personnel available for combat in the early stages of a conflict will be diminished.
Id. This result defeats the purpose of emergency call-ups. Id.
205. One of the most recent important decisions in this area is Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986). Goldman upheld an Air Force regulation prohibiting the petitioner, an
Orthodox Jew, from wearing a yarmulke while on duty. Id. at 510. In denying petitioner's
freedom of expression claim, the Court noted: "Our review of military regulations challenged
on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws
or regulations designed for civilian society.... The essence of military service is the subordi-
nation of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service." Id. at 507
(quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953)).
206. See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text (detailing exhaustiveness of recent
congressional debate regarding women's exclusion from combat); see alo supra notes 159-65
and accompanying text (summarizing Supreme Court's review of legislative history in Rosiker).
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positions, to qualified persons regardless of gender. Repealing stat-
utory restrictions on women in combat aircraft is a positive begin-
ning, not a satisfactory end. The Persian Gulf War has shattered the
traditional justifications for combat exclusions. Preventing capable
and willing women from participating in combat works an injustice
on women, the military, and the nation.
Combat positions should be opened to all qualified women on a
volunteer basis. This recommendation may disturb those who feel
that, in order to achieve true equality in society, women must be
subjected to the exact same liabilities as men. 20 7 On the other hand,
it will certainly be contrary to the thoughts of those who wish to
preserve the combat exclusions. Nevertheless, a large segment of
the American public, while remaining firmly opposed to requiring
women to fight, has recognized that qualified, willing servicewomen
deserve the opportunity to serve their country free from anachronis-
tic gender-based constraints.
Fear that opening combat positions to women on a voluntary ba-
sis would overturn the male-only draft and draft registration law
should not hinder the expansion of women's role in the military.
Congress enjoys broad judicial deference in regulating the armed
forces. The Supreme Court will not overturn a thoughtful congres-
sional decision that further opens the military to women but main-
tains current draft and registration policies. As evinced by
commendable performance in the Persian Gulf War and steadfast
diligence in the armed services throughout history, women have
more than earned the right to fight for their country should the
United States become involved in future armed conflict. As a na-
tion, we should not wait until a future war, however, to recognize
what we know today. The combat exclusions should no longer con-
stitute a barrier for well-qualified, professional servicewomen who
can get the job done.
207. See Hearings on S. 2294, supra note 198, at 1710 (statement ofJudy Goldsmith, Vice
President-Executive, National Organization for Women (NOW)) (asserting that if registration
and draft are instituted, they must include women as matter of equity). Though NOW op-
posed the reinstatement of draft registration in general during hearings concerning reactiva-
tion of the MSSA, the organization contended that if registration was commenced, women
and men both must be included in order to promote equity among the genders. Id. The
extension of such an argument would seem to assert that qualified women should also face the
same combat liabilities as qualified men as a matter of equity.
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